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Editor's Notes

In many developing countries a sharply critical eye is now often directed towards foreign consultancy services – expensive, frequently lacking local expertise and usually without any on-going commitment. Provided that there are available some locally-qualified personnel then, as Margaret Hardiman and James Midgley argue in this number, pointing to a successful project in Sierra Leone, how much better it is to set up a joint consultancy effort of indigenous and foreign resources, thereby *inter alia* helping to build up local capacity to manage future similar projects.

Success at Bo, and success too in India where the Mahatma Gandhi Co-operative Lift Irrigation Society, dynamically led by Gopal Reddy, cut across red tape and obtained remarkable productivity as described by Robert Wade.

B. K. Singh writes on Delhi with considerable personal practical experience of the great city's immense problems, particularly of housing. Here, inevitably, is no success story, but there is a story of slow and steady progress being made in hard and arduous conditions, and the author does show grounds for hope that the lot of Delhi's poor will see continuing and much needed improvement.

Still in Asia, the next article, by Cyril Gamage and Martin Minogue, examines the new District Political Authority System in Sri Lanka. Written jointly by a senior Sri Lankan official and a British academic, the clear picture is presented of an attempt to create a new approach in district administration which accorded with the political and social realities of the post-independence era in which, surprisingly for an often radically-led country, Sri Lanka had in its administrative structure changed comparatively little since the days of the British administrator. The authors see the possibility of the 1973 reform leading to more development at district level and to achieve this the transfer of more resources from the centre to the districts.

Taha el Jack Taha brings the Journal news of further developments on the Gezira Scheme – this time related to the new FAO sponsored fertiliser programme for which the author holds out high hopes.

After lengthy consideration we have finally decided to publish a number with all the articles relating to a single country. Our January issue will focus on Nigeria in this way and the views of readers as to whether this proves welcome or not will be much appreciated.

Foreign Consultants and Development Projects; the Need for an Alternative Approach

MARGARET HARDIMAN
JAMES MIDGLEY*

Foreign consultancy has become a growth industry in which new firms have proliferated and competition for assignments has become intense.

There is undoubtedly a genuine need for advice and expertise in countries where their own resources are inadequate, and successful programmes bear witness to the value of such provision, but doubts remain about the appropriateness of many arrangements. Not all the blame for the failure of projects or the problems surrounding them can be laid at the door of foreign consultants, but it is important to assess their share. The consequences of failure are expensive in terms of capital investment and human disillusionment. A programme that collapses has not just negative repercussions; it may positively set back development by prejudicing people against further efforts to get a scheme started, as for example in the case of many abortive attempts to develop co-operatives. And even when a project is apparently a success there is still need to consider alternative arrangements which might have contributed more in the long-run to the development of the local expertise which developing countries so desperately need.

Before looking at the approach which this article describes, we shall consider some of the problems surrounding consultancies which have emerged as a result of experience. In order to look at this question the wide range of types of assignment and consultancy arrangements must be recognised.

Types of assignments can broadly be divided into:

(1) *Pre-investment studies*, which precede the decision to go forward with specific projects, and these may again be classified according to objectives:
a where investment priorities and sector policies are to be established.
b where the basic features and feasibility of individual projects has to be determined.
c where changes in government policies, operations and institutions necessary for successful implementation have to be defined.

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(2) *Detailed design*, which involves the technical, socio-economic, and architectural work required fully to define the project, including cost estimates.

(3) *Implementation*, which includes inspection, field supervision, institution-building, putting recommendations into effect, and the design and execution of training programmes. This may involve the provision of staff to carry out certain functions or to start up the whole operation for an initial period.

The appropriateness of different arrangements will naturally depend on the type of assignment involved and the range of responsibilities assigned to one or more consultants. A consultant may, for example, be required to undertake all three stages, or several individuals or firms may be contracted to cover the whole assignment. An important consideration here is to what extent mid-term reviews are built into the programme and how much flexibility is allowed at different stages. Moreover, no mention has been made here of terms of reference, a crucial question in terms of project appraisal,[1] but an area in which consultants tend not to be involved.

Types of consultancies are broadly distinguished by whether the 'employer' is the lender or the borrower, and whether the assignment is carried out by a firm or by an individual or individuals. Within these broad categories there is a wide range of variation in the mode of operation, the length of assignments and the division of responsibility to borrowers or loan agents. The most usual procedure is for a consultant or consultancy firm to be retained by the borrower, with the approval of the lender; this method accounts for 90% of World Bank projects and covers the main funding of design studies and implementation. Cases in which the World Bank itself retains the consultant are usually for pre-investment studies, technical assistance, and for its own operations and research programmes.

The majority of consultants, and those for the most part handling the largest investment projects, are in the field of engineering and physical planning, and much of the literature on consultancies is written in this terminology. For example, the second stage of design is described by the World Bank as 'Detailed engineering design'. Although more attention is now being paid to human factors such considerations are still a minor part of the total exercise and tend to get neglected in the heat of the moment when time schedules have to be observed. Even when a sociologist is included in the team his assignment may be minimal and he himself may not be equipped by training or experience to deal adequately with the situation in the time at his disposal. Social planning is a relatively new discipline, not yet well-developed. It, too, is becoming a growth industry, but its practitioners are thin on the ground and there are too many assignments chasing too few experienced experts, particularly if knowledge of the cultural context of a project is a requirement. It is perhaps significant that at the Seminar on Consulting Services organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Washington

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[1]Birgegard, Lars-Erik, *The Project Selection Process in Developing Countries*, (E.F.I., The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm, 1975).

in 1972 none of the participants was a social planner, and the nearest that discussion got to human factors was in the consideration of problems relating to counterparts and the use of domestic firms. The fact that plans are not only *for* people, but have to be carried out *by* people is given scant attention.

For projects more obviously related to people, such as educational, community development or welfare programmes, the need to employ social scientists is better recognised, and besides academic qualifications attention is paid in selecting consultants to their experience of the region and their background in developing countries. On paper at least the processes of seeking foreign consultants appears sound and takes into account the importance of involving local experts.

Problems of consultancies

What then are the problems with which we are concerned? Some of them are technical, relating to such aspects as the reliability of estimates, the timing of projects, and the phasing of processes of consultancy assignments. Consultants are seldom used in the preparation of terms of reference, even when they are brought in to undertake a pre-investment study. These terms may be too explicit, too sketchy, or insufficiently flexible, constraints which are difficult to question or reverse at a later stage. This is a crucial stage in the selection process for public investment projects involving focusing on a project idea and substantiating it into a proposal. A striking characteristic of this process is the limited search for alternatives and the limited comparison between alternative projects. Research has shown[1] that after the basic characteristics of a project have been chosen at this stage very few radical changes are subsequently made.

Working from this base there is a tendency to construct overambitious, over-optimistic proposals, with lack of concern regarding recurrent costs to the borrower. As projects are usually linked with overseas aid there is a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the project in order to ensure adequate funding, and the consultancy input itself may be at little or no cost to the borrower, as is the case with many pre-investment studies. Governments in developing countries tend to lean on foreign experts, not only because they may genuinely need them, but for a variety of other reasons. They may doubt the ability of their own people, mistrust their judgment for political or ethnic reasons, or just consider the foreigner more prestigious and more likely to secure them the aid they require. In some cases there is pressure on the borrower to accept a consultant when all that is really wanted is a loan and a contractor.

More serious are the questions related to the appropriateness of projects to the needs and technology of a country. Long-term objectives tend to get lost in a sea of proposals which easily get further and further away from the possibilities inherent in the total situation of a country and the role of the project in its development. An important consideration here is whether the process of consultancy has resulted in developing sufficient expertise in the country to carry on the project

[1]See Birgegard, Lars-Erik, *op. cit.*

after the consultants leave. There has been much dissatisfaction with the training aspects of programmes.[1] In many cases the appointment of counterparts by the Government is a requirement of the agreement. But so long as the consultancy firm is responsible for the outcome this is not always seriously implemented. And many consultants are not educators, get impatient, and find it easier to do the job themselves, especially when target dates have to be met. Requirements laid down by lenders may also result in the 'overqualification' of consultancy teams when what is more important is that the team should be well-balanced, capable of working together, and affording opportunity for 'young experts' to be involved, both from the country itself and from overseas.[2]

The problem of securing the services of suitable consultants willing at short notice to spend periods of from 6 months to several years in a country are great. Many of those potentially suitable are not available as they are already employed on a full-time basis. Fielding a team in the time required is difficult and this causes delays and frustration. Moreover the cost of relatively long-term consultancies is great as it is necessary to provide accommodation for families, air fares, baggage allowances, and childrens' school fees. And there is the added risk that a consultant may not stay the full length of his contract and additional expense will be incurred by his replacement.

There are also problems of liaison with Government agencies and with other consultants in cases where these are linked projects being serviced by different agencies. Governments and personnel change, projects get out of phase and there is a need for a continuous assessment of the situation in order to avoid the danger of ossification. A project team may feel obliged to press on with an agreed plan, realising that what is needed is a complete change of direction or even the abandonment of the programme.

A more radical criticism of consultancies is that they are part of the paternalism or neo-colonialism that is felt to characterise so much overseas aid.[3] The foreign expert from a rich country is listened to for the wrong reasons, whether or not his advice is sound in relation to the country's needs. He is seen to be rich, to lead a life-style that is worlds apart from even his relatively well-paid counterpart, and he is in a position to pull the necessary strings to secure loans or further

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[1]See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *Seminar on Consulting Services* (Washington, 1972).

[2]See World Bank, *Uses of Consultants by the World Bank and its Borrowers* (Washington, 1974).

[3]See Bauer, P.T., Foreign Aid: An Instrument for Progress ? in *Two Biews on Aid to Developing Countries*. Ward, B. & Bauer, P.T., Occasional Paper No. 9, I.E.A., 1966. Professor Bauer considers that the contribution of much of the technical assistance personnel to the economic development of poor countries (which they often do not know very well) is likely to be small compared to that of the experienced administrators, businessmen and technicians who are now, voluntarily or compulsorily, leaving many of the countries receiving aid, especially in South-East Asia and Africa. Also see Bernstein, Henry, *Underdevelopment and Development*, Part Six. The International Context – Partners in Development (Penguin Book, 1973).

technical assistance. This image may well undermine the self-confidence of the people he is supposed to be helping; or even if their self-confidence is not damaged they may defer to his views out of politeness or the fear of adverse repercussions in securing aid. A more subtle danger is that the officials or counterparts with whom he works may themselves have had western education and are all too willing to be alienated from the cultural situation of their own masses. They may subconsciously underplay some of the constraints as a result of their own reaction to what may seem 'backward' attitudes or practices. So that when the foreigner thinks he is taking full account of local needs and conditions he may not recognise the implicit value premises of his assessment.

These questions of value judgments implicit in decision-making lead us into the complex field of politics. Consultants must keep broadly in line with policies laid down by the government, although they inevitably unsurp political authority to some extent.[1] How far can a foreigner, even if he has made a study in depth of the society, understand all the ramifications of decision-making, not only at the top but at intermediate levels? And this becomes particularly important where questions of implementation are concerned.

We have stressed the negative aspects of consultancies, as the object of this article is to draw attention to present deficiencies. This does not mean that we are unaware of the positive benefits that foreign experts can offer. Nor do we suggest that we are alone in our concern.

The World Bank, for example, has given much thought to increasing the efficacy of consultancies. Funds spent on this aspect of a programme may only form a small part of the total investment, but it is crucial to the success of a project. The Bank fully recognises the importance of local participation, particularly at the pre-investment stage, where government agencies should be fully involved in the study process. Great stress is laid on the recruitment of suitable counterpart staff and support services, and the necessity at the design stage to clarify the responsibility of consultants and government. Difficulties can arise here over the extent to which a consultant has sufficient power and discretional rights to exercise his responsibilities in carrying out the terms of the contract. This issue may become an over-riding one where there is, for example, dissatisfaction with the calibre of counterparts.

The World Bank also stresses the need to explore fully the existence of local talent, both consultancy firms and individuals. But it is cautious, as a result of experience, of joint arrangements if they tie the hands of a foreign consultant. A variety of arrangements are possible, but they must be clearly defined if they are to be put into operation successfully.

These problems suggest that it is desirable that alternative approaches to con-

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[1]See Little, I.M.D. & Mirrlees, J.A., *Project Appraisal and Planning in Developing Countries* (Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1974).

sultancy work be considered so that foreign consultants may be more satisfactorily employed in developing countries in the future. It is certainly clear that more discussion on the role of foreign consultants in development projects is required.

This paper examines the role of foreign consultants in a project currently being undertaken for the Ministry of Social Welfare and Rural Development in Sierra Leone. Known informally as the Bo Project, it is concerned with establishing a national training centre for rural development in the provincial town of Bo. It describes the proposals for the involvement of foreign consultants which were formulated originally and discusses the merits of an alternative and less conventional approach which was adopted.

The Bo Project

The Ministry of Social Welfare and Rural Development's responsibility for rural development and especially community development services in Sierra Leone originated in the early nineteen fifties. Established as a section within the Department of Education in 1944, it was concerned originally with social problems such as juvenile delinquency, vagrancy and urban destitution. By 1951, when it became autonomous, community development services were introduced in the rural areas. The Department initiated adult education and mass literacy campaigns, sponsored village health and sanitary programmes and supported a variety of local self-help rural construction projects.[1] At the time of independence in 1961, the Department became a Ministry and among its functions listed in the country's constitution at the time were 'social development, mass education and community development'. Local government authorities and international voluntary agencies were also involved extensively in rural community development but after the abolition of the District Councils in 1972, the Ministry assumed primary responsibility for the provision of these services.[2]

Although the resources which were allocated to rural development projects were meagre, successive governments have given much political support. In the nineteen fifties Prime Minister Margai toured the country urging local leaders to initiate local self-help development projects and more recently the country's leaders have sponsored several projects personally. It is now proposed to increase budgetary allocations to rural development and especially agriculture significantly. But local community development effort will be further encouraged. In his introduction to the country's current national development plan President Stevens wrote: 'Self-help projects will play a major role in the expansion of education, health, com-

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[1]These developments were in keeping with the creation of community development of 'mass education' programmes as they were known originally in other African colonial territories and especially in Ghana. See for example Brokensha, D. & Hodge, P., *Community Development – An Interpretation* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1969) pp. 25-36 and du Sautoy, P., *Community Development in Ghana* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958).

[2]For an account of the role of voluntary agencies and local government authorities in community development in Sierra Leone in the nineteen fifties, see Mould, P. S., 'Rural Improvement through Communal Labour in the Bombali District of Sierra Leone', *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January, 1966), pp 29-46.

munications and other essential services'.[1] However, recurrent expenditure on rural development programmes sponsored by the Ministry are estimated to amount only to Le 143,400 or approximately £72,000 in 1977-78. Capital expenditure on rural development projects sponsored by the Ministry in 1976-77 was estimated to be only Le 25,000 or approximately £12,500.[2]

In spite of inadequate government investment in rural community development projects, the Ministry presently has an establishment of some two hundred professional staff of whom about 88% are posted in the rural areas of the country. The majority of these are social development workers who are responsible for encouraging and assisting village people to undertake self-help construction projects such as feeder roads, wells, primary schools, rural health centres and court barries or village meeting places. They are responsible also for maternal and child health programmes, women's and youth work, nutrition and other rural development activities.

About 64% of the Ministry's professional personnel have been given some training in rural community development work at the country's community development centre which was established in Bo in 1962. But it was recognised that the courses which were provided at the centre were inadequate. They were of short duration, offered sporadically and were generally lacking in financial support, facilities and training materials. In the early nineteen seventies the Bo centre was closed and the Ministry began to plan a more suitable, extensive and permanent training programme for its personnel.

In 1974 the government of Sierra Leone entered into discussions with the International Development Association with the intention of obtaining credit for the construction of a new training centre at Bo for the Ministry's rural development workers. These discussions resulted in the preparation of a working paper which formed the basis for a credit agreement signed between the government and the International Development Association in July, 1975. It was agreed that prior to the disbursement of aid for the construction of a new training centre comprehensive research be undertaken into the needs of rural communities in the country in order to clarify the role of the Ministry's personnel and to ensure that an appropriate training would be provided. It was proposed that this research would take the form of a sample survey of the country's rural areas. The findings of the survey would permit an assessment of the training requirements of the Ministry's staff and provide factual information on which a suitable training programme and curriculum could be based. It was agreed also that a pilot training course would be run' evaluated and suitably modified before the centre began to function independently under the Ministry's auspices.

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[1]National Development Plan, 1974/5-1978/9 (Freetown: Government Printer, 1974).

[2]*Estimates of Revenues and Expenditure*, 1977-78 (Freetown: Government Printer, 1977), *Development Estimates*, 1977-78 (Freetown: Government Printer, 1977).

It was agreed that most of the costs of the research and curriculum planning aspects of the project would be met from credit disbursed by the International Development Association for this purpose. On completion of the sample survey, credit toward the construction of the centre and the purchase of teaching materials and equipment would be advanced. It was expected that a substantial proportion of the budget for the research and curriculum planning exercise would be spent on employing a team of foreign consultants who would be recruited on a commercial basis to undertake the necessary work.

The proposed consultancy

The proposal that a team of foreign consultants be employed to carry out the sample survey and plan the centre's curriculum conformed to establish convention. As in many development projects it was assumed that the project could best be implemented by foreign experts and the original working paper proposed that they take the initiative and full responsibility for the project. Little thought was given to the availability of local expertise within the country. The working paper which outlined the research proposals contained a list of the Ministry's senior staff together with their qualifications. Eighteen names appeared on this list. Fifteen had obtained academic qualifications abroad and thirteen possessed university social science degrees. Several had higher degrees. Among the universities at which these staff had been educated were Columbia, Edinburgh, Monash and Moscow. But the working paper made no reference to these qualified staff except to recommend that members of the Ministry's staff should be appointed as counterparts to the foreign consultants and that resources should be made available to allow the counterparts to travel to observe rural development training projects in other African countries.

A total of seven and a half man years was allocated to the foreign consultants. The team would comprise three core members supported by additional short-term consultants. It would consist of a sociologist or anthropologist, a community development expert and a training methods or curriculum development specialist. Two and a half man years was allocated to the community development expert and the curriculum planner each. The sociologist would spend one and a half man years working on the project. One man year was allocated to employing short-term consultants such as a nutrition expert and additional specialists knowledgeable in rural construction projects and the provision of village water supply services. It was proposed that these team members would not be recruited individually but that established commercial consultancy firms would be invited to tender applications.

It was envisaged that invitations to tender would be extended during 1976 and that negotiations would be concluded before the end of that year. During that year also, local Sierra Leonean counterparts would be identified and vehicles and other equipment required for the research would be obtained. It was proposed that the sample survey take place in 1977 and that the curriculm planning exercise be completed during that year. The pilot training course would be held and evaluated in 1978 and the centre officially opened in 1979.

Several commercial consultancy firms submitted bids but it soon became clear that the costs of employing a team of foreign consultants had been underestimated. The bids were in excess of the construction costs of the centre and one firm, which submitted a promising bid, estimated that the salaries, travel and cost of living expenses of its team would amount to approximately Le 300,000 or about £150,000. Not only was this more than was originally envisaged but since Sierra Leone would eventually meet all these costs through repaying the International Development Association's loan, the government was reluctant to accept that expenses of this magnitude were justified on what was not a major development project. Attempts were made to interest an international voluntary organization which had been actively engaged in rural development work in the country for many years to implement the project. But this organization lacked experience of the type of research and planning required and for this and other reasons it was not possible to participate. The problems of recruiting a team of foreign consultants to implement the project caused serious delays which were compounded by the Ministry's amalgamation with the Ministry of Education in May, 1976.[1]

During 1976, the Ministry approached the British Council in Freetown to discuss the possibility of recruiting a British team of consultants to undertake the work. It was hoped that the costs of employing a British team sponsored by the Council might be kept within the original budget or that these costs might even be met through British aid resources. The Council wishing to have the project assessed fully invited an independent consultant from a British university to visit Sierra Leone in December, 1976. After becoming familiar with the project and the work of the Ministry in general, he was requested to advise on the role of foreign consultants in the project, to assess how quickly the project could be implemented and to comment on the proposed strategy for the project's implementation. His recommendations initially caused some disquiet among the Ministry's senior professional staff but were subsequently accepted.

The alternative

Some of the Ministry's senior staff fully expected the British consultant to endorse the previous proposals and to recommend that the British Council recruit and field a team of British experts who would implement the project in the way envisaged in the original working paper. But this view was not shared by all concerned with the project. The British Council Representative, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry and the International Development Association's Education Project Unit Director in Freetown had already begun to question whether a consultancy of the proposed magnitude was really required.[2] They had considered the possibility that local Sierra Leoneans supported by foreign consultants might be able to implement the project and that in this way, costs might be reduced considerably.

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[1]After the national elections of May 1977 the Ministry became autonomous again.

[2]The International Development Association's representation in Sierra Leone is related to the type of operation. There is, for example, a Project Unit concerned with aid disbursements for agricultural projects and another for educational projects. Matters concerning the Bo Project were dealt with by the Educational Project Unit.

But they did not put this view to the consultant who was invited to give an independent opinion.

The consultant gave attention to several inter-related factors. These were the costs of the proposed consultancy, the timing of the project and the availability of local expertise. The project had been delayed already and it was clear that much time would be required to recruit a British team, to negotiate salaries and conditions of employment and to field the team in Sierra Leone. There was the additional problem that a suitably qualified team with relevant experience and knowledge of African conditions might not be found at short notice. The cost factor could possibly have been resolved by seeking official aid but this would have required negotiation and resulted in further delays. But above all, the availability of expertise in Sierra Leone suggested that there was a strong case for considering the appointment of a local project team who would take full responsibility for implementing the project. As indicated previously, there were within the Ministry several well-qualified personnel who appeared to be potentially qualified to implement the project. The consultant was able to meet a number of the Ministry's staff and to assess their abilities. It was clear that several possessed appropriate qualifications. At the consultant's request two members of the staff were assigned to work with him and there was the added advantage that one had previously studied at the consultant's university. A third potential team member was soon identified. All three possessed higher degrees in the social sciences. The major problem, however, was that none had first-hand experience of undertaking social surveys although all had been trained in survey methodology. Two had a special interest in curriculum development and had taken courses in this area. The problem of insufficient experience of survey work could, however, be overcome by recruiting a fourth team member with relevant experience and also by providing specialist short-term foreign consultants who could assist with the design of the survey and the training of the interviewers.

After discussions with the British Council Representative, the consultant submitted proposals to the Ministry. He recommended firstly that a team of Sierra Leoneans with appropriate qualifications be appointed 'to assume full responsibility for the planning and implementation of the project'. He proposed secondly that short-term local and foreign consultants with specialist skills be employed to advise the team on specific issues and problems. He took the view that these consultants should not be concerned with administrative and policy issues related to the project as a whole but concentrate on providing advice on matters of a technical nature. The consultants would, for example, be required to assist the project team to design the sample survey and other proposed research studies, advise on sampling, interview schedule and questionnaire construction and help also to train the interviewers and undertake a pilot study. It was thought that consultants might also be usefully employed in the preparation of reports and in the analysis of data. At a later stage consultants could be employed to assist the team with curriculum planning and the evaluation of the pilot training programme.

These proposals implied that a flexible approach be adopted. Although it was

already clear that there were technical matters related to the proposed research studies on which the project team would require assistance, it was felt that the team should be able to call for additional assistance should it be required. There were disadvantages in this proposal for the final costs could not be estimated with accuracy at the outset.

These proposals were, however, acceptable to the Ministry and the International Development Association Education Project Unit Director. The British consultant was requested to prepare an interim budget giving the estimated costs of employing foreign consultants in this way. The Ministry expressed the wish that a British team of consultants be recruited to advise the Sierra Leonean project team and that the British Council act as their agents. The proposed budget contained inflation proofed travel expenses, general subsistence allowances and reasonable fees and amounted to approximately Le 25,000 or £12,000. This was a significant reduction on previous estimates made by interested commercial firms.

Within a month of the British consultant's visit a project team of Sierra Leonean personnel recruited from among the Ministry's existing staff was appointed and funds were made available for the purchase of a vehicle, office equipment and the appointment of secretarial and ancilliary staff. A core team of three foreign consultants was recruited in Britain during January. This was possible because they were required to travel to Sierra Leone for short periods only and would not have to enter into elaborate negotiations and contractual agreements concerning salaries, housing, conditions of service and other matters. Although it was proposed that the foreign consultants become familiar with the country it was recommended that they would not take decisions concerning local cultural or other conditions themselves: these would be the responsibility of the Sierra Leonean project team. It subsequently became clear that this was wise for it was unlikely that a team of foreign consultants would have been able to comprehend the complexities of rural society in the time available or adequately interpret the results of the research. It also became apparent that a local team with suitably-trained interviewers were more able to establish relationships with the communities included in the sample than were foreign consultants.

As the elections which were held in May, 1977 were preceded by considerable political tension in the country the project was delayed somewhat. But the preparation and design of the research studies had been completed during February and in March the interviewers were recruited and trained. In the same month a pilot study of two villages in the rural areas near to Freetown were completed. The survey was initiated after the elections in May and it was completed in September, 1977. The results of the research were analysed during October and in the following month a major report containing the findings of the survey as well as a study of the personnel employed in the Ministry of Social Welfare and Rural Development was published. By this time the International Development Association and the Ministry had expressed satisfaction with the way the project had proceeded and construction work on the centre's buildings was begun. In spite of considerable initial delays caused by the failure to appoint a team of foreign consultants it is now envisaged

that the project will be completed in 1979; the date proposed in the original working paper.

During 1977 the various foreign consultants visited Sierra Leone on seven occasions on short visits. Sierra Leonean team members came to London on three occasions. During the curriculum planning stage several Sierra Leonean consultants with specialist knowledge assisted the team. The original budget prepared by the British consultant in December, 1976 has been only marginally exceeded and the total foreign consultancy costs still amount to only a fraction of the estimates contained in the bids submitted by commercial consultancy firms.

Problems and prospects

Although the foreign consultancy adopted in the Bo Project has clear advantages over conventional approaches it has disadvantages and may not be suitable in all cases. Its advantages are that it reduces consultancy costs, allows the recruitment of consultants of high calibre who may not otherwise be able to spend several years abroad, can be implemented speedily, permits local specialists to take a greater responsibility for local development projects, allows them to learn and gain experience of dealing with technical and administrative problems directly and does not involve foreign consultants in difficult local political and administrative issues which they may not fully comprehend.

It is, however, entirely dependent on the availability of local expertise as well as leadership and administrative ability. Although technical problems can be dealt with by calling for external advice, local specialists have full responsibility for the overall administration and implementation of the project. Where this is inadequate or absent the project may falter and foreign consultants, however committed, cannot assist if they are not permanently in the country. It may be said that the question of responsibility and accountability can be ambiguous. Local specialists may expect the foreign consultants to take a greater share in the overall administration of the project and to provide more moral support. The consultants may see their role as being too confined to the provision of technical advice. Even where consultants may desire to be more fully involved, their limited and sporadic participation may prevent this. It may be argued that this type of involvement will not foster continuity or provide opportunities for establishing good working relationships with the project team. Because of this, foreign consultants may be able to claim that the failure of a project is not their responsibility even though they may have given inaccurate or inappropriate advice.

Although it may be desirable that local specialists gain experience and learn by undertaking projects for which they may not be fully qualified, mistakes can be costly in both financial and human terms. These could be averted if suitably-qualified experts were available permanently. It may be that unforeseen technical problems arise suddenly and that a foreign consultant cannot be called on at short notice. If such problems occurred regularly, the consultant may well spend a great deal of time travelling and the costs of a 'shuttle consultancy' of this kind may prove to be more than that of employing a full-time consultant. As suggested

previously it may be difficult to estimate total foreign consultancy costs at the project appraisal stage. Few donor agencies would be amenable to the suggestion that a flexible or 'open' budget for foreign consultants be approved.

The consultancy approach adopted in the Bo project was experimental. Although there were numerous difficulties, no serious problems of the kind discussed previously arose. Also there were several factors which facilitated the successful implementation of the project and the consultancy. Local expertise and experience of administration was available. The project was well supported by those involved indirectly. These included the Ministry's officials, the British Council staff and the International Development Association's executive and Education Project Unit Director. The team was highly motivated and morale remained high. A good relationship between the consultants and the team was established and this was partly because the consultants knew the project team leader previously. Although the project and the consultancy has been judged to have been a success by the donor and the borrower, it remains to be seen whether a similar approach can be implemented in other situations.

Leadership and Integrated Rural Development: Reflections on an Indian Success Story

ROBERT WADE*

Examples of successful multi-purpose economic cooperatives are not common, and still less common are examples of successful cooperatives which undertake a wide range of 'social' as well as economic activities within the same organization. The Mahatma Gandhi Cooperative Lift Irrigation Society is one of the latter. It is based in the village of Gaddipalli, adjacent to the command area of the Nagajunasagar Left Bank Canal, in Nalgonda District of Andhra Pradesh, India. From 1965 to 1969 this area suffered continuous drought. With the arrival of Nagajunasagar waters, cultivators with land within the command area had a measure of protection. But those on the upper side of the canal had none, and not even big farmers could afford the costs of unauthorized lift irrigation. To give relief to these areas (part of the stronghold of the Communist movement of 1946-48) the Andhra Pradesh government passed an order allowing the formation of lift irrigation cooperatives to take water from the canal onto the higher ground above it. The biggest and by far the most successful of those which were formed was the Mahatma Gandhi Cooperative Lift Irrigation Society (henceforth called MGS for short), which began in 1969.[1]

It was the brain-child of Dr Gopal Reddy, son of a Gaddi-Palli landowner and a Ph.D. in soil chemistry from an American University. At the time he was an assistant professor at Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University, and took a short period of leave from his university post in order to get the cooperative going, intending then to return to the university. But once the lift facilities had been provided (sufficient to lift water 90 feet in two stages), it rapidly became clear to Gopal Reddy and the other members that they would have to undertake comprehensive and coordinated development of their land if the water was to be effectively used; and it also became clear that technical advice must be provided for the farmers, who had never used irrigation before; and that marketing facilities and storage would be necessary. Village industries could be formed to fit into the emerging agricultural economy. But in Dr Gopal Reddy's vision, mere economic improvement was not sufficient. As a disciple of Aurobindo he believed that economic improvement was only a step on the way to the development of the whole personality. Therefore social, cultural and spiritual needs had to be looked

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[1]The following account is based on a short visit in December, 1975. I am grateful to the National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad, for arranging this visit, and to Ronald Dore and Waheeduddin Khan for comments on the paper.

after as well. Hence the organization became a *comprehensive* cooperative, including among its concerns home life improvement, health care, schools, group activities of a cultural and recreational kind, and fostering religious awareness.

In relation to the difficulties the achievements to date have been impressive. Twelve hundred families in seven villages constitute the Society's membership. Before it began, only two to two-and-a-half thousand acres of the villages' seven thousand acres were cultivated each year, and then for only one crop. Now five thousand are irrigated, twice a year, making a four-fold increase in gross cropped area. Paddy (almost inevitably) is the main crop, though Gopal Reddy is making efforts to move into less water-intensive crops, especially in the winter season (*rabi*). Yields have roughly doubled. Fertilizer use in the surrounding district averages about Rs 100 per acre (1975 prices); the Society's members use three to four times that amount. Gopal Reddy claims an average increase in farmers' incomes of more than four times. Wages in kind have more than doubled. There is now a permanent shortage of labour in the area, whereas in the past people regularly migrated out in search of seasonal work. All this in the space of five years. Moreover, the progress has occurred despite frequent power failures, which have reduced the pumping time from a planned 20 hours per day to an average of 14 hours, and despite a defective and hastily drawn up design of field channels and drains which the Society is now having to correct. The Society's experience has proved valuable in devising new methods of land development for the Command Area Development Programme[1] in Andhra Pradesh.

In 1970 the primitive village school had one teacher and twenty-three pupils. Now there are 900 pupils. Dr Gopal Reddy claims a pass rate of 80 percent in the matriculation exam, compared to the district average of 30 percent. The Society employs its *own* teachers, and makes sure that they teach not only what the government requires them to teach but also what is relevant to the life which most of the pupils can expect to lead: a life of agriculture and village industry. A small farm has been given to the school to provide the pupils with a means of guided learning about agriculture. The Society has its own agricultural extension staff, quite separate from the normal district extension department. Interestingly, the extension staff are not graduates – early attempts to employ graduates failed when the graduates declined to spend long days in the fields talking to the farmers; the staff are now diploma holders given additional training on the job by Gopal Reddy and his principal assistants. The Society now has its own storehouses where fertilizer and seed can be stored prior to distribution, and where members can store their grain after the harvest until it is sold either to the Society, at the prevailing market price, or to a private merchant. The Society also has its own machine

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[1]'Command area' refers to the area irrigated from a single source. The Command Area Development Programme, now one of the central thrusts of India's agricultural development strategy, aims to improve the performance of agriculture in areas irrigated from large-scale canals. See Government of India, Draft Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1973, Vol II, pp 111-113, Robert Wade 'Water to the Fields' in *South Asian Review*, 8(4) and Robert Wade 'The case of India's Command Area Development Programme' in *Pacific Viewpoint*, September, 1976.

workshop where its 40 tractors (and other equipment) are repaired by its own mechanics. (However, recently these tractors have begun to be mortgaged to private owners within the membership, partly in order to both keep the tractors stationed in dispersed locations over the Society's area and have them properly maintained. One would expect this change to have effects on the Society's operation via the distribution of power within it.)

The centrepiece is the shrine to Aurobindo, a strange structure inspired by the Auroville[1] architecture, shaped like an airport observation tower. Here regular prayer meetings are held, and it is conveniently placed for small daily acts of devotion. In this way the project aims to help meet spiritual needs as well as those of a more materialist kind. One of the Society's typescript documents described it as follows:

> This is a multi-purpose co-operative society which organizes multi-facetted programmes to cover all the areas of rural growth. The objective is to usher in social justice and economic equality through fraternity without losing liberty. It is an experiment in integrated rural development; the growth of the personality of masses – mental, social, educational, economical, cultural and spiritual. There is a tremendous spiritual upsurge in the whole area and the first act of gratitude of the people was to construct a beautiful shrine for the installation of Sri Aurobindo's relics.

The Society has not been without problems. The land development work had to be done on an *area*, not ownership basis. All the landowners had to mortgage their land against a loan from the State Bank of Hyderabad, and agree to common structures, like watercourses and drains, being laid across their boundaries. Many of the small holders had their land voluntarily consolidated, though there was never any question of putting the land under common ownership or of working it jointly. However, not all the owners were eligible to receive bank loans against their land, whether because they already had bank overdues, or possessed no title, or had lands above the land reform legislation's ceiling; and here Dr Gopal Reddy took a short cut. The money obtained by mortgaging the eligibles' land was used to develop not only their land but also that of the ineligibles (because land development had to be on an area basis, which meant that the land of an ineligible could not be excluded from the development). And with part of the same funds the land of those who were eligible but who had not yet obtained a mortgage was also developed, in anticipation of its being mortgaged, whereupon the funds would then be used for the development of still another block, the land development always being one or two steps ahead of the mortgaging. The crunch came when the people of one hamlet whose land had been developed in this way, ahead of the mortgaging, decided, at the suggestion of a 'political party', not to allow their land to be mortgaged: what was the need, when it had already been developed? And another crunch came when some ineligibles, with bad harvests, showed reluctance to repay, leaving the eligibles in whose name the whole debt burden legally rested to carry the whole load. But in both cases the Society was powerful enough to

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[1]Auroville, near Pondicherry in the state of Tamil Nadu, is the centre of Aurobindo's movement.

overcome resistance, and it appears as though financial difficulties of this sort will soon be solved. The Society's power lies in its control of all the inputs a member needs – seed, fertilizer, credit, and most important, water. Without the cooperation of the Society he can do little. This is what the people of the hamlet found out when they decided not to allow their already developed lands to be mortgaged.

My intention is not to give a detailed account of the Society's operations or achievements, but rather to ask to what extent it might be used as a model for government-sponsored schemes. The demands for lift irrigation schemes can certainly be expected to increase as lift technology improves and political articulateness increases. And the demand can be expected to be met not just because irrigation is a resource of enormous value for attracting political support,[1] but also because it is being widely realized that in areas where canals run in contour (rather than along the ridge), seepage down the slope from the canal tends to suck groundwater from the upper side of the canal, with the result that tanks and wells on the upper side tend to run dry. Thus the villagers living on the upper side not only do not benefit from the canal, but they actually lose. The case for allowing them lift-irrigation facilities is therefore very strong.

Now the MGS has attracted much admiration amongst irrigation and agricultural experts, not only within India but also from abroad, and the Andhra Pradesh government has asked Dr Gopal Reddy to suggest suitable legislation covering lift irrigation cooperatives in general. It is undoubtedly sensible for the government to encourage such cooperatives by reducing legal obstacles to their emergence and continued existence. But I have doubts about whether the MGS is a suitable model for the government to attempt to follow *in government-sponsored schemes*. The principal reason lies in its very comprehensiveness, and the subsidiary reason lies in its dependence on Dr Gopal Reddy.

Let us stand back from the case of the MGS for a moment. If one considers the (admittedly meagre) literature which deals with the formation of suitable institutions for rural development[2] two conclusions emerge fairly clearly. The first is that cooperatives which are set up from the beginning as multi-purpose, covering input supply, marketing, credit, and perhaps infrastructure construction as well, have a high mortality rate; whereas those which are set up with single objectives have a better chance of survival, and once well established, may then add on a small number of other activities with a better chance of success; especially if these activities involve them in eating into the large profit margins of private trades. The second conclusion is that comprehensive rural development programmes (those that aim at a range of objectives, including the economic and non-economic, such as health, education, group activities), while they may succeed on a pilot project

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[1]Robert Wade, 'Performance of Irrigation Projects' in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 11(3) January, 1976.

[2]See: M. G. Blaise, *Institutions in Agricultural Development*, Ames, Iowa, 1971 and J. W. Eaton (Ed), *Institution – Building and Development*, Sage, London, 1972.

basis, are rarely implemented successfully on a large enough scale to make much impression at regional or national level.

Take the Comilla experiment in Bangladesh as an example.[1] Comilla is the name of a district in which the Bangladesh (formerly Pakistan) Academy for Rural Development was established in 1959. The Academy's purpose was to train public officials responsible for rural development, and as part of the training it undertook a programme of community development in the villages of the district through which the officials under training could carry out action research. The programme was clearly successful in improving standards of living, in diffusing technological change, in improving local government capacity. The cooperatives, which were the primary institutional vehicle for village and *thana* action, did work and they were multi-purpose. (The big farmers of the area initially ignored them and only once successfully established and beginning to threaten their own interests did they attempt to take them over. But that is another story.)

Two points about the experiment should be noted for present purposes. First, the cooperatives, though multi-purpose, were concerned very largely with *agricultural* objectives: with agricultural credit, on terms sufficiently attractive to replace the traditional moneylenders; with diffusing technical information about rice production (and also about health), with managing capital investments such as tube wells, handling the distribution of fertilizers and seeds, and organizing services such as tractor hire. They also undertook infrastructure improvements to roads, irrigation facilities, and drains. They were not much concerned with rural industries, home life improvement, health facilities, family planning, schools, group activities or religious awareness. Secondly, the cooperatives and the rural development programme generally, depended on high levels of highly-trained manpower; and not just highly trained, but fired by an ideology of rural uplift. After Independence the Government of Bangladesh announced that Comilla would be used as the model of a rural development programme that would cover all 412 of the nation's *thanas* (using plans that had been drawn up prior to Independence). The results have been very different, it seems, from those of the pilot project. Almost inevitably the national programme is less intensive in its use of professional and technical manpower; and almost inevitably the programme personnel are on average less motivated and dedicated than their pilot project counterparts. I suggest that *the results of the national programme would have been better if the programme had not used Comilla as a blueprint but had been thought out afresh*, tailored from the beginning by full recognition of the limited resources, particularly of professional and technical manpower, available for a national programme. This would have necessitated a tighter definition of priorities, and a narrower range of objectives. What is particularly sad is that the likely adverse consequences of trying to generalize the Comilla model were well known at the time the plans were made (see Khan, 1971), but the national plans went ahead regardless.

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[1] See: W. Haque, *et al Towards a Theory of Rural Development*, Asian Development Institute, Bangkok, and A. H. Khan *Tour of Twenty Thanas*, Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development, 1971.

The Vicos project in Peru is another much-quoted example of successful comprehensive rural development. In 1952 Cornell University bought the lease of a *hacienda* (large estate) in the mountains of Peru, which entitled them to the services of the 300 Latin American Indian families bound to the hacienda. (Vicos is the name of the hacienda). However, unlike previous leaseholders, Cornell'sobjective was to encourage the Indians to take over the running of the hacienda for themselves, so that at the end of five years, when the lease expired, they themselves would be in a position to acquire it. Now these were people who for 400 years had lived in conditions of extreme poverty and servitude, and they had developed all the cultural traits which are generally found among people living in these conditions. They were almost completely illiterate, their agricultural methods were primitive, they showed no signs of innovativeness or entrepreneurship, they were deeply fatalistic and apathetic. After a short time under the guidance of the Cornell team, however, they were sending their children to school, were submitting themselves to preventive (as well as curative) health care, agricultural yields went up 400 percent as new techniques were developed, and, to judge from the project reports, they daily became more like the good citizens of the United States![1] These results do demonstrate to the sceptic that it is possible, in the right circumstances, to alter in a short period of time habits and beliefs which appear to be deeply ingrained; or more precisely, to alter in a short space of time those habits and beliefs which are a response to oppression and material deprivation. This is a significant conclusion; and anyone who has noticed the frequency with which agricultural and irrigation officials at district level in India talk of the conservatism, laziness, and fatalism of the peasant as innate qualities hindering all their best efforts will know that the lesson has not yet been fully learnt.

But two rather important qualifications need to be made about Vicos. The American supervisors were able to put pressure on the Peruvian government at the very highest levels – they even persuaded Teddy Kennedy to intervene on their behalf during a visit he made to the country. Any difficulties they encountered with the local government bureaucracy or with local influentials could thus be overcome. Secondly, although the project reports (all unfortunately written by people directly connected with the project, with a personal interest in its success – independent assessment has not been allowed) show the Americans as guides and technical advisors, a close reading of the reports suggests that, on the contrary, they adopted a highly authoritarian position in the community. This in itself is not a bad thing – they could not have been as authoritarian as the previous lease-holders, and a strong arm may have been essential for the first five years or so in order to bring about improvements to the point where the local people were able to think about self-management; but the reports may be misleading in so far as they obscure the essential role played by leaders who were not only highly and expensively trained and deeply committed to the success of the venture, but also had enough power and legitimacy to carry out exactly what *they* thought needed to be done.

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[1]See: H. F. Dobyns *et al*, (Eds) *Peasants, Power and Applied Social Change: Vices as a Model*, Sage, London, 1974.

Vicos snows how much *can* be changed in a short period of time, even among people whose social organization and culture have become adapted to survival in conditions of harsh poverty and direct oppression. But it would be quite wrong to suppose that the same thing might be repeated on a large scale throughout the Indian communities of Peru, even if the government were interested in doing so. The resources and above all the leadership which Vicos required are simply not available. A large-scale programme would have to aim at far more limited objectives, with a longer time scale. And yet the great temptation for a liberal government would be to try to duplicate Vicos, by undertaking equally comprehensive community development measures in large numbers of communities; or at least to proceed by thinking simply in terms of a scaled-down version of Vicos without recognizing that the approach may have to be significantly different if resource constraints are very much tighter.

'The more comprehensive the programme the higher the chances of success'. This could be taken as a key proposition in the view of rural development promulgated in many UN (especially FAO) publications. As an example of the obscure generality which often characterizes discussions of integrated rural development, take the following from the UN publication, *Integrated Approach to Rural Development in Africa:*[1]

> ... the concept of the 'integrated' approach in the context of rural development means an 'integral' approach in the sense that it is a highly-structured and systematic exercise in which all components in the system of development can be understood as important and appreciated for the part which they play individually and collectively. In this sense, the concept differs for the 'harmonization' of plans and the 'co-operation' of various agencies. It also has significance for the co-ordination of rural development plans. (UN 1971)

Or, from another UN publication,

> Within the executive organization there needs to be maximum co-ordination between irrigation engineering, agricultural development and land settlement at all levels. (UNDP/FAO 1969)

In India, too, integrated rural area development planning is the orthodoxy; whatever is done, it must be 'integrated'. This is not a mere matter of words. The effort is to be as comprehensive in one's view of the problem and in one's plans for action as possible. Though there are important differences between the community development efforts of the 1950s and the integrated area development efforts of the 1970s, they have this characteristic in common: a desire for inclusiveness, for comprehensiveness. As an example of 'integration' thinking, take the following comment by one of the formulators of India's Command Area Development Programme:

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[1]Robert Chambers in *Managing Rural Development* (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1974) has a fascinating discussion on the use (or misuse) of the concept of 'integrated rural development', and related ideas. I owe both the following quotations to Chambers. *Social Welfare Services in Africa*, No 8, July, 1971, and UNDP/FAO *Mahaweli Ganga Irrigation and Hydro-power Survey*, Final Report, Vol I, Rome, 1969.

Originally Command Area Development was really to be integrated, nothing was to be left out. Education, medical services, everything was to be included. Because otherwise people would get more money and start to waste it. We wanted a complete package, including everything. All the services needed to build a higher social order must be included.[1]

He went on to lament the dilution of the programme as it appeared in the Plan documents and even more as it is being implemented on the ground.

One reason why concepts of integration are so important in discussions of rural development is that to identify something as 'integrated', or to set up an organization which integrates people, departments and resources formerly unintegrated, gives a reassuringly concrete sense of progress. It gives a feeling of security against the risks of failure – for nothing which might be important has been left out, everything has been taken into account. The major danger of the current fashion is exactly that it allows ignorance of the real problems to be masked: to state that something is being done in an integrated way conveys the impression, both to ourselves and to others, that we have more insight into what the problems are and what to do about them than we have in fact. This masking effect is particularly useful when programmes are to be sent for financing to outside bodies, whether the Central government or international organizations; a condition of financial assistance may be that the programme is seen to be 'integrated', in the belief that the risks of failure will therefore be lower.

The experience of Comilla, Vicos and the MGS, as well as other multi-purpose projects,[2] suggests that cases of successful multi-purpose rural development projects tend to be associated with highly skilled, highly dedicated, and relatively autonomous organizers. What these projects do not give much guidance for is the question that any government has to face if it wants to pursue a multi-purpose community development programme on a large-scale: namely, what components can be included if the programme is to remain within the limits of available organizing skills, and what components must be excluded. China's rural development experience may have something to teach here: for its rural development programmes seem to have been carried out efficiently with relatively untrained people in directive positions at the local level; yet they are certainly multi-purpose.

China's experience is singular in another important respect. A method of organization seems to have been found which both allows for large-scale replicability and does not sacrifice performance for control objectives. It successfully combines administrative decentralization with centralized determination of goals.[3] But in most other cases programmes with a large number of objectives tend to suffer mutation as the administrators become more concerned in practice with control

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[1]Interview, January, 1976.

[2]The Etawah project in India, a pilot community development project which ran from 1948 to 1952, is another instance which bears out the general position.

[3]For a sceptical impression of the extent of real financial and administrative decentralization in China see A. Eckstein *China's Economic Performance*, Michigan University Press, 1975, p 355 ff.

than with performance. With a large number of objectives to be sought more or less simultaneously it is indeed difficult to decide which to aim at. Consider the situation of the Village Level Worker in India's Community Development and Agricultural Extension Programmes, with some 60 objectives to hold in mind. Naturally he tends to go for those which are easiest or those which are most ambiguous as measures of performance. Both control and performance objectives suffer in consequence; and not incidentally, agriculture is first to be neglected.[1]

Put more generally, the larger the number of components to be administratively integrated, the higher the cost – in time, in friction (people do not like to be integrated), in the sacrifice of performance for control. It may be suggested that the costs increase more than proportionately with the number of components, especially if the components include both the economic and the non-economic.

This tends to be the case whether the organization is public or private. But the magnitude of the effect is certainly greater in the case of government organizations. The need for information to be put in a form required for government processing, the need to follow government regulations (which almost necessarily must be intended for general application, at the cost of misapplication to specific situations), greatly increases the cost of coordination. Imagine the situation if Dr Gopal Reddy was replaced by a civil servant: worried about salary and promotion and transfer, concerned to please his next higher officer and to give no grounds for accusations of wrong-doing, spending his time filling in application forms, having to accept as a teacher in his school whoever the education department wanted to post there, to accept as agricultural extension officers the choice of the Agricultural Department, concerned to maintain his status gap and cultural distinctiveness in relations with villagers. The success of the MGS is critically dependent on the autonomy of the director to innovate, to experiment, to take short cuts; and the same applies to Comilla and Vicos and the other examples of successful comprehensive rural development projects. In other words, they are dependent on just those characteristics which are most unlikely to be found in government-sponsored schemes large enough in number to make a significant impression at the regional or national level.

If one is thinking of government-sponsored schemes on a large scale, wisdom lies in starting from the opposite of the FAO view: with the proposition that the chances of success increase the fewer the factors to be administratively integrated, and with production factors given first priority (since poverty in most poor countries is more a problem of low output per head than of distribution). There should be integration of planning; but not administrative integration of operations, unless it can be demonstrated clearly both that the simultaneous provision of factors is *necessary* (that the absence of one set significantly *harms* the effectiveness of another) and that there is no alternative way to secure simultaneous provision except through authoritative administrative integration.

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[1]The issues raised here are brilliantly explored by S. J. Heginbotham in *Cultures in Conflict: The Four Faces of Indian Bureaucracy*, Columbia University Press, 1975.

The only counter argument is the 'big push' argument – that it is easier to make changes acceptable if the idea of renovatory change is made all-pervasive. This may work to some degree for short periods of history – when there is a revolutionary people's government, or after independence, but the initiation of rural development projects hardly counts as a chartering event of that sort.

The second important guideline for government-sponsored programmes is that there should be no attempt to blue-print the administrative structure and the phasing for the entire nation in programmes which depend importantly on a response from villagers (which is what India's Community Development Programme did attempt to do). What a national body can do is to experiment – or sponsor experiments – in a range of solutions and suggest the sorts of conditions in which each is likely to work. It must then be left to lower-level bodies to decide which is likely to work best – preferably again on the basis of experiments conducted within the local area by an organization similar to the Academy at Comilla.

If one thinks of rural development efforts outside the government sector, attempts at 'rural self-reliance', at mass mobilization guided by an ideology of class struggle, constitute an important direction of advance.[1] But the chances of success along that route seem insufficiently good to dismiss the type of enterprise exemplified by the MGS as 'reactionary' and not worth the attention of concerned students, activists and planners of rural development. Unfortunately, however, the reaction against the orthodox sociology of development in the 1950s and 1960s – a desirable reaction, on the whole, for the orthodox sociology of development during that period was marked by an exceptional obscurantism – now seems to have gone so far it is difficult in the 1970s to be taken seriously if one talks about leadership. As Ronald Dore remarks, even 'charisma's' time is running out.

The big question is whether one can institutionalize the type of leadership shown by Gopal Reddy in any way, and the role of government in doing so. I suspect there are quite a lot of potential Gopal Reddy's in India – landlord's sons in industry or the Public Service who might be prepared to take a couple of years out of their normal life to go and do good. What the government might do is to have a team of technical people who identify situations where the introduction of a new resource, technique, or crop could make a fairly substantial difference to local farming incomes. Then there would be a selection procedure for the potential leaders which concentrates on personality characteristics and general inventiveness and initiative, rather like the officer selection procedures used in Britain during the Second World War.[2] Then the selected leaders would be told: you are allowed this much of seed money and for the rest you must rely on the market, raise your own funds and buy your own services.

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[1] W. Haque, *et al*, *op cit*.

[2] P. E. Vernon and J. B. Parry, *Personnel Selection in the British Forces*, University of London Press.

There are certainly drawbacks in conferring legitimacy on educated sons of the rural elite as 'agents of change' – drawbacks in terms of the consequences of reinforcing the existing distribution of wealth and privilege. But there are also advantages (which the new sociology of development is liable to overlook). Foster's theory of 'the image of limited good' (1965) helps show why. Foster has suggested that peasants tend to see the world of the village as a place where not only wealth but also power and other 'goods' are limited in amount; more for one means less for others. They therefore seek power and wealth only insofar as they are prepared to make enemies of other villagers. But those who are born rich and powerful are often immune from these constraints; and also those who have acquired a stake in the world beyond the village, especially by means of education. Leadership coming from such people is more likely to be accepted than would leadership from lower down the village hierarchy. This conclusion may not be palatable to many concerned students of rural development. But somehow one has to come to terms with the common tendency for villagers to be divided by bitter factional disputes. Someone with roots in the village, who is accepted in some respects as 'one of us', linked by ties of kinship and caste, marketing and worship, but who also has unquestioned high status, may be in a better position to avoid these disputes.

For these same reasons, such persons are likely to be able to operate with villagers in terms of shared values and identities, without brokers – something which government officials are not likely to be able to do. They are therefore more likely than government officials to be able to induce concerted action. And the units they form are more likely to be sociologically relevant, grouping people who sense interdependence, rather than the creation of administrators' convenience.

Rural development needs to be thought of not as a flow of crops, roads, water, clinics, produced by a sophisticated engineering-like structure made up of input-output linkages; but as more like organic growth, in which cells are added and slowly become more specialised; as a cumulative process in which people learn slowly, keeping one foot on familiar ground, in which things happen in sequence, not simultaneously. Projects of the MGS kind, led by people like Gopal Reddy, may have a role in rural development seen in these terms.

A Study of Housing and Urban Planning in Delhi

P. K. B. SINGH*

Historical Legacy

Delhi has an ancient history of splendour and of squalor, of destructions and of persistent reconstructions, beginning with tenth century BC Indraprastha of Maha-bharat. It got its present name from Raja Dillu, a scion of Ashoka, who rebuilt it in the first century BC. Within an area of 6 by 12 miles on the right bank of the River Yamuna and bounded by the Aravalli Hills, as many as seven or seventeen Delhis have emerged from 'merely royal precincts to the entire city',[1] leaving behind ruins, fortifications and a legend. Of these, Shahjahanabad built between 1638 and 1649 AD is 'still a living city, accommodating about half a million people in two square miles of its area – nursing in its lanes and by-lanes, streets and katras the tradition and heritage of about 330 years'.[2]

Shahjahan (1628-1803) built the monumental buildings for Royal Palace and Royal Mosque in the Red Fort and Jama Masjid and laid the boulevard Chandni Chowk. Around these the city as laid out then had wide roads, gracious parks and houses of the nobles with large courtyards combining the Mughal architectural concepts with the varied necessities of the seventeenth-century life. The city was encased with walled fortification of 1,240 acres for a population of about 60,000 at a density of 50 persons per acre. An organic and cohesive life of that bygone era gave rise to compact structures for living. The comparatively disadvantaged had to seek their habitat outside the walls of the city in mud and straw clusters, not unlike the present jhuggie-jhomprie[3] cluster of today, and a historian of that era records their frequent devastation by fire. However, the walled city with age and growth today presents one of the worst examples of overcrowding with 487 persons per acre in 2- and 3-storeyed structures; the history of Delhi explains the causes.

The Imperial New Delhi, formally opened in 1931, was laid out on the garden city pattern for 3,200 acres with a maximum population of 65,000. The Theme of Imperial Power is evidenced in the location of the Viceregal House and Secretariat

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[1]Gerald Breese: *Urban and Regional Planning for the Delhi-New Delhi Area:* Princeton, N.J., 1974 – notes seventeen settlements of Delhi; the last being planned by the Republic on India, p 6.

[2]Jagmohan: *Rebuilding of Shahjahanabad – The Walled City of Delhi:* Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1975, p 2 and p 31. *Katra* means a special enclosure of the houses on three sides, generally shared by several families and congested.

[3]Jhuggie means a hut built with insubstantial material. The cluster is called Jhuggie-Jhomprie.

commanding 'like an autocrat with his two fists, the view of India Gate, symbolically India'.[1] The first garden city in India is a Western transplant, separated and sanitised from the old city by an open space buffer beyond which in geometric patterns lie its wide avenue (60-440 feet), double rows of trees and vistas connecting points of interest. The most prominent is the Central Vista – an East-West axis of the new city exactly parallel to Chandni Chowk the East-West axis of the old city and by implication the twain shall never meet. The residential areas were laid out with lower and middle income employees to the north of the Vista and senior British officials to the south in an hierarchical pattern. Also to the north of the Vista were laid the fashionable shopping centre of Cannaught Place and the New Delhi Railway Station, thus insulating the new quarters of the Imperial Government from the inroads of the natives. South-west of the new city a 10,000 acre military encampment called the Cantonment was located. It was three times the area of the new city and nine times the area of the walled city.

With one acre of park to 10 acres of developed area with maximum density of 25 persons per acre, no attempt was made to relate the new to the old city. The historical enigma lies in the fact that the British by planning and enforcing extensive parkland and open spaces in the north and south of the walled city, kept not only a distance between the rulers and the ruled but also hemmed the ouflow of the population from the central gradient of density to its periphery. The walled city legacy is one of the worst congestions found anywhere in the world.

Delhi and India made its tryst with destiny when Independence became a reality and Partition a holocaust. Millions crossed the man-made borders; an estimated half a million or more sought shelter in the lap of Delhi. Delhi was not prepared for this doubling of its population in just two months. Tents were pitched to house those uprooted. Through years of improvisation, adjustment and resettlement they were moved into permanent rehabilitation housing townships – 8 in west, 4 in south and one each in north and the east across Yamuna River. In hastily acquired lands schools, services and shopping of marginal standards was provided. 'These were emergency projects and no time was available for formulating or following planning standards. A national emergency was met with immediate action[2]' bequeathing large areas having deficient development.

National Government and Planning

With the advent of a national government and enlargement of its activities, additional housing for government employees was provided in 5 townships in the South and South-East of the New Delhi while 3 private townships grew to house the rich. Delhi started expanding in all directions but without any overall plan. New disjointed townships provided only mass shelter without any organic link to the old or new Delhi. As the Birla Committee reported there were multiple

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[1]Bijit Ghose: 'Cities of Our Making': *Indian Journal of Public Administration:* New Delhi, Vol XIV, No 3, p 471.

[2]*Delhi Master Plan – Work Studies*, Vol I – Delhi Development Authority New Delhi, 1960, p 9.

agencies to run the city but the Delhi Improvement Trust had undertaken neither a civic survey nor a master plan with the result that congestion continued, the city grew haphazardly and land passed into the hands of speculators. It noted that Old Delhi meanwhile had 'been sliding into a vast slum'[1]. It recommended both the creation of a central planning Authority to make a plan for Delhi and to provide it with adequate powers, and enjoined the Government to use its 6,000 acres of land for housing immediately. The Government acted only in 1955 by enacting the Delhi (Control of Building Operations) Act and creating the Delhi Development (Provisional) Authority and Town Planning Organisation to act as its advisers. By September, 1956 an Interim General Plan for Greater Delhi was issued to 'hold the line'. Its guidelines were sufficient to infuse a new sense of purpose but Delhi had to cope with the constraints imposed by the British legacy'.[2]

A new urban institution – a non-taxing, land holding, development and housing agency – was set up under the Act of Parliament in 1958 to formulate and ensure the development of Delhi according to a plan. Simultaneously, the jurisdictions of various local bodies were brought under one Municipal Corporation of Delhi by a separate statute, but, leaving the Lutyens' New Delhi and the Cantonment under direct central Government control.

The Master Plan was given statutory shape in 1 September, 1962. It assessed the existing deficiencies in housing, community facilities, services, etc. and projected requirements of a future population of 4.6-5.6 million population in 1981. From the urbanised area of 42,700 acres in 1958-59, it enlarged the 'urbanisable' limit to 110,500 acres allocating 47,400 acres to housing, 25,000 acres to parks and open spaces, 5,800 acres to Industries, 900 acres to Government offices, 2,900 acres to Institutional, 1,500 acres for exclusive commercial uses, leaving 25,800 acres for roads, urban villages, etc. All operating agencies were brought within the overall framework of the Plan.[3]

Public control through acquisition of the entire urbanisable vacant land was considered a pre-requisite for the implementation of the Plan. 'The basic objective of the acquisition scheme, which was financed through a Revolving Fund of Rs. 50 million, was to evolve rational urban land policy and to lease out plots in devloped or semi-developed form to various sections of the community keeping in view the dictates of social and economic justice'. The public ownership is considered 'one of the biggest socialist measures and proved a great boon to the community as it eliminated private profiteering, created huge assets in the form of land and facilitated smooth and planned implementation of housing and development schemes'[4]. As of 1974, some 35,000 acres have been acquired and the initial fund of Rs 50 million has been revolved to the extent of Rs 1,000 million. In addition to its planning and land development functions, the Delhi Development Authority

[1]Quoted in Breese: *op. cit.*, p 21.
[2]Quoted in Breeze: *op. cit.*, p 21.
[3]*Delhi Master Plan:* Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi, 1960, p 86-93.
[4]Jagmohan: 'Housing and Town and Country Planning in India': *Indian Journal of Public Administration:* New Delhi, July-Sept., 1971, Vol XVII, No 3, p 517.

(DDA) operates a scheme for resettlement of squatters, relocates the industries, develops the 'green' and the urban villages, runs commercial complexes, transportation terminals and has made available 130,000 plots either directly or through cooperative Housing Societies. It constructs large scale public housing through a separate investment of Rs 380 million and has added 24,392 houses directly to the housing stock of Delhi, details of which are reviewed below.[1]

Population

The population of Delhi is increasing at 4.4 percent annual compound growth rate. In contrast, the growth rate of Greater London and Paris is negative, while that of Moscow, New York, and Washington is less than one percent; Delhi's nearest rival is Cairo at 4.2 percent in the last decade. Throughout this century population growth of Delhi has been phenomenal – from 208,000 in 1901 at an average 52.3 percent per decade to 3,647,023 in 1971.

The Work Studies of the Delhi Master Plan made its projections (using Coals and Hoover Studies) as follows:

Population of Delhi	1951	1961	1971	1981
		(*in millions*)		
Low Parabola	1.4	2.07	2.84	3.75
Medium Low (4.5%)	1.4	2.18	3.30	5.01
Medium High (4.5%)	1.4	2.23	3.47	5.38
High (4.75%)	1.4	2.29	3.64	5.78
Average	1.4	2.14	3.31	4.98
Actual	1.4	2.3	3.64	?

The analysis stated that 'Since the projections are on the whole rather on the low side, the possibility that the population of Delhi city and Delhi Territory may be larger than the projected averages is greater than the probability that these limits will not be reached.'[2] Against this Kingsley Davis predicted Delhi's population as 6 million on the low and 8 million on the high side in 1970.[3] The Master Plan high projection was supported by the mean annual growth rate of 4.8 percent for the Delhi territory population for 1921-1961 decennial counts. Though the Master Plan calculations are based on an average of projections, it took care of the high side by permitting a variation of plus or minus 15 percent in actual practice of planning and, thus is realistic.

Housing Stock

According to a 1957-59 field survey of urban Delhi, there were 87,665 plots (group housing taken as one plot) and 385,000 dwelling units with an estimated 1,774,600 people living in them. (The survey did not include Shahadra township, the

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[1]Statistical figures from Delhi Development Authority: Fifth Five-Year Plan/Programme of the DDA, 1974-79, 1974.

[2]Delhi Master Plan – Work Studies – Vol 1: Delhi Development Authority, Delhi, 1960, p 36 – Delhi Territory is like the District of Columbia a federal district.

[3]Kingsley Davis: 'Urbanisation in India': in Roy Turner (Editor), 'India's Urban Future', 1962.

Cantonment and the Jhuggie clusters). The study of the condition of structures revealed that 56% in Old Delhi and 10% in New Delhi were in poor condition. The total structures requiring replacement in next 10-15 years was estimated to be 28,000 – out of which Old Delhi accounted for 18,000, i.e. over 64%.

The ministries of the central Government and private enterprise had between 1951 and 1958 developed or earmarked for develjpment 142,000 dwelling units but they were able to create only 101,745 dwelling units by 1958.[1] *Only* 13,370 or 13% were constructed by private enterprise. No survey since then of the condition of the structures is available. A review of the Master Plan by the Town and Country Planning Organisation thought that 'certain shortcomings in this respect (evaluation of the housing programme) are so conspicuous that they do not require much statistical evidence' and thus dismissed any sample survey or detailed analysis.[2]

This study goes on to observe that 'Apparently housing for the low income groups had made little progress'. At about the same time the National Council of Applied Economic Research's (NCAER) publication, stated, 'As a matter of fact, achievements in some cases were higher than the targets laid down. This was particularly true of the housing for low income groups.'[3] While the NCAER did carry out a sample survey o ' housing the TCPO had not done so before making its observations and yet we have no comprehensive survey of the conditions of structures in Delhi since the 1957-59 survey.

Review

The 1957-1959 field survey found in Urban Delhi (excluding the Jhuggies Cantonment and Shahadra) 385,800 dwelling units – defined as a normal living area of one family with one kitchen. The NCAER report is based on a sample household survey and hence a comparison in terms of dwelling units is not possible. But the improvement in housing stock and conditions of living is indicated by the NCAER report on the basis of distribution of households by rooms and amenities available to them in 1970.

	Proportion of Households (in per cent)					
	Urban Delhi			*City Zone*[1]		
	1961		1971	1961	1971	
In 1 room	63.44		51.99[2]	63.8	46.1	
In 2 rooms	23.67		25.59	22.5	35.2	
In 3+ rooms	6.95	12.89	11.68	6.8	11.4	18.7
In 4+ rooms	5.94		10.74	22.42 6.9	7.3	13.7

[1]Walled city

[2]Including Jhuggi-Jhomprie households counted as one room.

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[1]Delhi Development Authority: *op. cited*, p 97 and p 186.

[2]Town and Country Planning Organisation: Ministry of Works and Housing: *Review of Master Plan for Delhi:* Feb., 1973, New Delhi, p 54.

[3]*The Techno Economic Survey of Delhi:* New Delhi, March, 1973, p 5.

Proportion of Households by Annual Income Size
(In percent in 1970)

Less than Rs 2,400	19.2
Rs 2,400-7,200	50.3
Rs 7,200-18,000	23.5
Over 18,000	7.0

Source NCAER: Techno Economic Survey of Delhi March 1973. Work Studies – Delhi Master Plan Vol I, Table 9.3.

A review of the housing situation in 1970 should take into account two aspects of the report. Firstly, the total population of urban Delhi since 1961 had increased from 2.3 to 3.6 millions and the household size increased from 5.0 to 5.4 persons. Secondly, the jhuggie families increased from 43,000 in 1960 to an estimated 93,500. The latter is a special problem and was dealt in a special way by the survey but has been included as one-room households in the total housing.

That the proportion of the household in one room dropped from nearly two-thirds to half of the total number of households in a decade in a resource-constrained society is indicative of positive urban and housing policy. If the number of jhuggie households is subtracted, the decline in the proportion of households in one room accommodation is substantial.

The proportion of households living in three or more rooms increased from 12.8 to 22.4%. Observations by some of the critics[1] that only the rich were housed in better housing is incorrect as only 7% of the households constitute the high income group, 19% of whom were also found living in two or even one room dwellings. The survey indicates that a substantial proportion of middle income group households lived in three or more room housing which can be categorised as better housing.

It can be observed without contradiction that a good number of households having less than Rs 7,200 income also moved into two-roomed housing – this is more clearly brought out by the increase of this housing in the city zone from 22.5 to 35.2%.

In 1970, 3,384,274 persons of urban Delhi were found living in 1,111,425 rooms. This is a reduction in persons per room from 3.1 to 3.05. If the jhuggies (which were included in one-room housing) are left out, then the pressure per room is further reduced to 2.89 persons. This is remarkable achievement in permanent construction and in housing supply (when the population increase is so large) in all zones excepting Shahadra, where the number of persons per room increased from 3.13 in 1960 to 3.52 in 1970, largely due to lack of development effort on the other side of the Yumuna river.

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[1]Ashis Bose: *Studies in India's Urbanisation* – 1901-1971: Tata McGraw Hill Publishing Co., Bombay, New Delhi, 1973, p 184.

Amenities

In terms of amenities, comparative kitchen and bath facilities have increased proportionately and in absolute numbers. While the toilet facilities have increased in absolute numbers its proportion to total housing has declined slightly, as shown below:

Distribution of Households by Amenities (percent)

	1955	1970
All with kitchen	42.3	62.0
All with bath	41.4	57.3
All with toilet	63.6	57.3

Source NCAER Survey: *op cit:* T. 79.

The proportion of households enjoying all facilities of plumbing has increased from 30.1 to 46.9% – an increase of more than 50%.

The proportion of households having no facilities whatsoever has remained the same, mostly because of the inclusion of Jhuggies in this category. The remaining 23 percent of households were found to be served by varying degree of facilities. Thus there has been improvement in amenities to the housing stock.

Residential Density Pattern

'Sharp diversities were created when New Delhi was planned as an Imperial City and Old Delhi was left to its own devices'. Extremes of residential densities were found by the Work Studies in 1958-60 – from acute overcrowding in parts of the walled city with a net density of over 1,000 persons per acre, to spacious living in New Delhi area of net density of 20 persons per acre. It was found that in the Old City, the Pahargunj-Sadar area had a gross density of 300-400 persons per acre. Elsewhere the population density varied from 50-175 persons per acre. The analysis showed that Delhi sprawled out linearly in post Partition development along the existing arteries. Large agricultural areas in between were left open. Even where the development had occurred it was deficient in services and the result was that within a few years of their development each of the residential areas got infested with retail, service and repair, shops and with small industries and the like.

The Delhi Master Plan presented the densities for new residential areas which range from 75 to 150 persons per acre. Leaving certain aberrations like J.J. clusters, these have been adherred to and complemented by the DDA and other regulatory agencies. Despite the laudable schemes of decongestion of the walled city and Sadar-Pahargunj areas, not much has been done in this respect. Recently the Slum Clearance Agency as distinct from J.J. Removal Scheme has been placed under the management of the DDA (1974-5) for speeding up the work of slum clearance and decongestion.

DDA – *op. cit.* – Vol I, p 85.

Dimensions of the Housing Problem

There are four projections of the dimensions of the housing requirements of Delhi at different times namely:

1 The Work Studies which were based on field survey, 1951 census, and the sample survey carried out by the Delhi School of Economics and Town Planning Organisations in the report published in 1960 stated that by 1981, Delhi would require for its estimated population an additional 750,000 dwelling units. Its finding on existing stock was 385,800 dwelling units with 1,774,600 population. It estimated in 1957, a deficit of 100,000 dwelling units.

2 The report of the Expert Committee set up by the Government of India on Methods of Achieving Large Scale Low Cost Housing Construction in Major Cities the shortage of permanent residential units as on 1 July, 1970 was 3,800,100. Since the report is not available, it cannot be said as to what number of units it found existing in Delhi on that date.[1]

3 The NCAER in its report estimated that at the existing rate of concentration of 5.4 persons per household, in 1983-4 there would be 1,012,000 households as against 632,154 in 1970. To its estimated requirement of 379,846 units it added 93,500 Juhggie families. Assuming 1% annual renewal and the existing DDA costs per housing unit for different categories, it estimated that the magnitude of housing costs would be Rs 1,400 Crores (140 billions).

4 Delhi Development Authority's Five-Year Plan/Programme (1974-1979) estimated that to house 5.3 million people at 4.5 persons per household, 1,180,000 dwelling units would be required by 1981. It estimated existing stock at 350,000 dwelling units out of which 70,000 were provided by the Government and 24,300 by DDA.

Since each of the projections has its own assumptions, definitions, time scale and its own estimated number of existing stock, it is rather difficult to reconcile the figures of housing required. One thing is common to all the projections: the immense magnitude of the housing problem.

In addition to the overall problem, add the deficiencies of plumbing. In 1955 the Delhi School of Economics survey found 70% of the households living with deficient or even no plumbing.[2] The deficiency was reduced to 53.1% by 1970. Yet 335,674 households (93,500 in jhuggies) had a varying scale of deficiencies in plumbing or even no place to cook, bathe nor a toilet.

Public Housing

In view of the magnitude of the problem and resource constraint, Delhi and India 'have a problem not of housing in the conventional sense but of shelter, not of comfortable living but of roof over head, not of spacious colonies (townships) but of avoiding extreme congestion and creating an atmosphere in which the

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[1]Quoted in: Town and Country Planning Organisation: *op. cit.*, T16.

[2]V. K. R. V. Rao and P. B. Desai: *Greater Delhi – A Study in Urbanisation*, 1940-57, Delhi, 1965, p 301.

personality (of the city dweller) is not stifled'.[1] The public housing and the Jhuggie Jhomprie resettlement policies are designed to meet these problems.

The aim of housing provided by the Delhi Development Authority, according to its Vice-chairman, is for simplicity in design, utility in its function, and construction of the maximum number of units at minimum cost. The DDA entered into large scale construction of houses in November, 1967. The scheme has aroused the 'instinct of saving for a home' successfully and raised funds by way of advance registration. That is, the intending purchaser is required to deposit with his application Rs 5,000 if he belongs to middle income group: Rs 3,000 if he belong to the low income group: Rs 500, if he belongs to the Janta group.[2] The deposit carries an interest of 7% per annum. The scheme is a novel way of raising housing finance in a low income country. Its other merits are that it assesses effective demand, secures initial investment and links a housing scheme with compulsive saving on the part of the purchaser. With its First and Second Registration Schemes, the DDA collected Rs 100 million. It then raised 140 million loans from the Life Insurance Corporation of India and Housing and Urban Development Corporation. It also raised Rs 10 million from the open market. It has received Rs 130 million from the sale of houses. All this has enabled it to make an investment of Rs 380 million in public housing directly, in addition to development of land. This is so far the largest investment made in public housing sector by a single agency in India.

The houses are constructed on a group-housing development basis (two or multi-storey apartments) which are not divided into customary streets and plots; they are of good design, as inexpensive as possible, and open spaces and community facilities are ensured. Intensity of land use is high but care is taken to keep gross density at the master plan density requirements. It uses maximum coverage of 35% to a maximum Floor Area Ratio of 150-175.[3] To reduce costs the housing is largely without lifts and is taken to a maximum of 4 storeys. They are functional, adequately serviced and are set in pleasant neighbourhoods. The houses for middle income group have a plinth area of about 700-1,000 square feet at a cost ranging from Rs 45-40,000 inclusive of land, its development and municipal services. For low income group apartments of 2 rooms (exclusive of kitchen, toilet and bath) the cost varies between Rs 12-25,00. Under the Janta category, a one room unit (Kitchen, toilet and bath separate) costs Rs 8-10,000. Heavily subsidised housing for service personnel of one room units with adequate services has been priced at only Rs 2,000, of which the allottee pays only Rs 20 per month.

To enable the purchase of a flat/apartment on easy terms a 'hire-purchase' system has been introduced. In comparatively advantaged areas, the allottee[4] will have

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[1]Jagmohan: *op. cit.*, Vol XVII, No 3, p 516.

[2]Janta = People, relating here to the lowest income group.

[3]Floor Area Ratio is floor area multiplied by 100 and divided by plot area. In three to four-storeyed construction with 35% coverage, it is rarely achieved.

[4]Allottee is the outright or 'hire purchase' lessee of the flat or apartment. Wherever there are more applicants from the registered persons than there are flats, the allocation is made by lots drawn in public.

paid 50% of the cost and will repay the balance in monthly equated instalments over 5 years; for a middle income purchaser it was Rs 224-264, depending on the size of the apartment. In comparatively less popular areas the allottee pays 30% of the cost and the remaining 70% in 180 equal monthly instalments. In the case of low income groups the schemes have generally required a 30% down payment and monthly instalments spread over 15 years, which according to 1970 DDA report averaged some Rs 98.45 per month. The terms of the hire purchase scheme vary according to locality and time of construction and are generally linked with the cost of loans raised by other public agencies.

By 1974 the DDA had completed 24,300 such houses. The public response to the whole scheme under two registrations was 36,700. It is encouraging and there was clamour for opening a Third registration. The DDA propose to 'continue the present pattern of the scheme with slight modifications in respect of cost and incomes'.[1] It proposes to construct, 50-75,000 houses for 1974-79 period. This ambitious programme is dependent on availability of building materials, loan facilities to the intending purchasers and to DDA, and the capacity of the public to meet the advance registration fee.

Jhuggie Jhompries

The Resettlement of the Jhuggie dwellers has been seen by some[2] as moving of a slum from one point in the city to another. The commentators of this kind make no distinction between slums and Jhuggie Jhomprie clusters or 'bustees', probably as the quality of life in both is substandard. While a slum is dilapidated and deficient housing resulting from years of neglect and no maintenance, a Jhuggie is no housing at all. It is 'identified by conglomeration of huts or shacks of tin or wood built on any conceivable open piece of land and almost always in an unauthorised manner'. It is extreme poverty and a low standard of life which forces human beings to huddle themselves in such squalor and filth, under most dehumanising conditions'.[3] A special census in 1960 found 54,842 households living on public lands in these conditions, consisting of 256,896 persons in 636.34 acres at 404 persons per acre. Some 32,729 then lived on 285 acres at a maximum density of 1,634 persons per acre in dwellings which were 'all huts, built of mud or stone walls and bamboo posts and covered with thatch, sirki,[4] and tin sheets or rags and cardboards'.[3] There was an appalling lack of water, of latrines and of electricity, which made life very uncomfortable and very hard. The jhuggie dweller earned less than Rs 1,200 per annum. There were few or no internal roads merely passages which became muddy during the rains. In low lying areas water entered the huts. There was an utter lack of community facilities like schools, medical aid, shops, parks, playgrounds and community centres. In addition obnoxious trade and keeping of animals (like milch cattle, pigs, tonga horses, poultry), laundries, tanning,

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[1]DDA: Five-Year Plan, p 35.
[2]NCAER, *op. cit.*, p 97.
[3]Delhi Master Plan – Work Studies, Vol I, p 223-238. All quotes and figures, p 223-238.
[4]Sirki = thatch bound by twines.
[5]Delhi Master Plan-Work Studies, Vol 1, pp 223-238. All quotes and figures, p 223-238.

lime kilns, etc., only aggravated already bad and insanitary conditions. 'The bustees are plague spots in an urban setting', noted the Master Plan Work Study, 'and are concentrated areas of insanitation, crime and vice, which are both a disgrace and a source of danger to the city as a whole'.[1]

The Central Government in 1960 formulated the Jhuggio-Jhomprie Removal (JJR) Scheme for removal of the squatters from Government land and their resettlement in alternative accommodation on properly laid out estates with certain basic amenities. By March, 1971, 52,540 temments/plots were developed in 16 estates and 45,189 households were living in them. Basic amenities of drinking water, water-borne sanitation, street lights, roads, open spaces, schools – were provided. All the estates have asphalted roads, all weather approaches to plots, surface drains, street lights, school sites and playgrounds, and an area for community centres. By 1971, 12 DDA dispensaries and 4 privately-run hospitals and 5 community centres with TV sets, library and social services had started serving the resettled families.[2] By 1975, an additional 20,000 families had been resettled in such estates.

The resettlement of Jhuggie dwellers on developed land only is an admission of paucity of funds to build houses for the weaker sections of the society but it is also a brave attempt to better their living conditions within limited resources By 1971, Rs 81 millions were expended for resettlement. Generally a whole neighbourhood of squatters is moved *en masse* permitting them to live together and share together the newness of the surroundings and improved conditions of life. The family has still to live in make-shift housing which their funds permit but over time it has been found that they have constructed their own permanent houses. As pointed out earlier, in contrast to their former living in the worst of sanitary conditions, the resettled family now lives in a residential complex with a gross density of about 150 persons per acre. At the new site the settler enjoys certain basic amenities which some slum dwellers of the city lack. The family has a kind of title to the land allotted to him and this stands in good stead as an insurance and as capital for his betterment. The location of the resettlement estates is close to large-scale building areas and to industrial estates. Some have been overtaken by the residential growth around them and have become part of larger residential areas. The critics of the JJR scheme have generally described it on the grounds of increased distance to work place without going into the fact that these areas are linked to housebuilding or industrial activities, and though the uprooted jhuggie dweller has to rearrange his work place he is undoubtably better off than before.

Housing Finance

The traditional housing finance has come from individual savings and private

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] Based on note of J.J. Department of DDA. Author was Executive Officer-in-charge of J.J. Dept., 1971-1973.

The plot size is about 25 sq. yds. It is generally back to back and in row housing of 10-20, with depth ratio of 1:2.

enterprise but in countries such as India this has been so inadequate that housing shortages have only multiplied over the years. The gap between incomes and housing costs has simply denied millions the chance of adequate housing.

National Plans have accorded low priority to urban housing which has not been recognised in India as a factor in economic growth. Housing is seen as a welfare expenditure. 'There has been a dangerous trend of inverse ratio between the physical gap in housing and the financial provision made', observed the then Central Housing Minister, K. K. Shah, a situation amply borne out by the total plan expenditure on housing by Government from 1951-52 to 1968-69 of 2,136.7 millions. The fourth plan expenditure was 1,891.4 million (including for office accommodation, 31.7 million for concrete factory, experimental housing, and statistics).[1] It means that total housing investment by the government sector all over the country has been only Rs 3,879 millions when, according to one estimate, the housing requirement of the country needs in 1972 was Rs 330,000 millions. Of late the Government effort has materialised in the creation of the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) in November, 1970 with a seed capital of Rs 300 millions. As has been observed earlier, HUDCO has financed some of the public housing schemes for Delhi through the DDA. The Delhi State input in housing from 1951-52 to 1968-69 was Rs 88.4 million constituting 4.9% of the total planned outlay. This, however, does not include the central Government housing for its employees.

The Government housing expenditure covers subsidised industrial housing, slum clearance, low income and middle income group housing, and rental housing schemes. It also includes housing loans to its employees repayable from salary. But all told the Government places large reliance on private sector investment. It has allowed in its Fifth Five-Year Plan for an outlay of Rs 2,348.4 millions for housing schemes. It is expected that for the country as a whole another Rs 4,500 million would be invested by Central Departments of Railways, Posts and Telegraph, Defence, and other government and public undertakings. 'The estimated expenditure in housing by the private sector is likely to be of the order of Rs 36,400 millions'.[2] The Plan strategy is to continue existing schemes, to provide support to HUDCO and state housing boards, and to intensify research development of cheap building materials.

In the field of housing finance the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Life and General Insurance are nationalised in India) has played a significant role by providing Rs 1,191.4 millions up to 1968-69. In Delhi LIC has provided direct loans to the public (in addition to loan to the DDA of 100 million by 1973-4), under 'Own Your House Scheme'. Though the scheme is a success its spread over the population appears has not been considerable. Its loan policy is conservative. An analysis of the loan assistance is not available but it appears that the loan has

[1] Quoted in Shivaranakrishnan: Urban Housing Challenge and Response: *Economic and Political Weekly*, Bombay, 1969.

[2] Govt. of India: Planning Commission, 'Draft Fifth Five-Year Plan', New Delhi, 1974-79, p 263.

been offered to the comparatively advantaged section of society.

While the government servants obtain loans from their employer, the para-stotel undertakings and nationalised banks, private employers and other banks also give housing loans to their employees. Apart from the DDA's hire-purchase plan noted above there is no easy public financing agency for the low income group people.

There has been another effort made by private developer-cum-promoters of high-rise buildings in New Delhi in financing high income apartments. A New Delhi area was leased out to private parties when the Imperial city was being built. These plots with dilapidated one or two-storey buildings on them are scheduled for redensification in the Master Plan. The private promoter shares 33% of the expected floor area with the lessee and starts his plan for construction by inviting public participation in registering the intending purchaser jointly on an admission fee. With each rise of a floor an installment from the intending purchaser is taken and thus before the high-rise building is completed the promoter and owner realise the whole cost in advance. They then finish the building and hand over to the owners who join in a cooperative society for a fresh lease of the land from the Government. The per square foot cost has been charged from Rs 80 to 125 as against Rs 60-70 for high-class finish in a plot developed by private and affluent citizens. A large amount of profit is being made on government-owned land. A high-rise building corporation to mop up the incremental value of such lands in New Delhi and in the old Civil Lines area can enter the market with HUDCO, DDA and LIC sharing the capital.

In conclusion, the Delhi situation is comparatively better than in Bombay and Calcutta. In abysmal poverty, it has shown a pioneering effort in land management, in coping with the squatter problem, in land development, and in mopping up incremental values of urban land for development purposes. Due to its urban land policy, Delhi has adequate space for its population projections. It has both expertise and finance to continue the land development required for housing. In the field of public housing Delhi has introduced a plan to arouse in Delhiwallahs an instinct to save for a house. In the field of squatter colonies it has undertaken their re-settlement on more humane basis of life by providing them homesteads with certain basic amenities.

A lot yet remains to be done in housing. It is suggested that while large scale resettlement of Jhuggie dwellers should be continued with vigour, new JJ town-ships should be developed with adequate public transport. High-rise buildings in the Central Business District should be planned and their construction and finance be brought into the public sector to mop up the incremental values of the land by the sale of floor areas for commercial use. The profits should be ploughed back into public housing for the weaker sections on a subsidised basis and for all those affected by these buildings to be resettled in the same complex. For developing the group-housing pockets, the present DDA scheme through cooperative effort and through hire-purchase should be pursued vigorously.

Refinance, mortgage insurance, tax incentives, etc. should be made available at national level to buttress the present fund-raising efforts. The nationalised banks have yet to play a role in this sphere. The present restrictive laws against repossession of a house on default is retrograde and in contradistinction to the public responsiveness to save for housing, and should be repealed.

Planning and implementation for housing and other community needs is a continuous process. Delhi has set an example for several cities in India to follow. This study points out Delhi can hopefully bring the experiment to a success by continuous planning and implementation.

The District Political Authority System in Sri Lanka

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Introduction

The 'revolution of rising expectations' has placed a considerable burden on the administrative and political systems of developing countries, for 'people' expect 'Government' to deliver development, and to deliver it quickly. But these systems are not always well equipped to meet the expectations placed upon them. The literature on 'development administration' emphasises the crucial role of the administrative system and the 'administrative State'; at the same time, there is acknowledgement of the inevitable limitations of the resources – men, money, and material – available to the administrative system in most developing countries. Rarely are practicable solutions offered to the central dilema: that an undeveloped political and administrative system is itself a defining characteristic of 'under-development' at large, and that it will not be easy for such a system to find within itself the resources to make good its own characteristic deficiencies.

Where the literature does engage with this dilemma, the focus of attention is the relationship between 'the political system' and 'the bureaucratic system', and upon the proposition that the establishment of an effective 'administrative State' depends upon the strengthening of political institutions in such a way as to assert the control of political over bureaucratic structures. Only then can there be a direct relationship between what the political administrative system produces, and what the socio-economic system demands.

A related tendency in the literature on development and administration has been to invoke the virtues of decentralised systems of government, a decentralisation which may take almost limitless varieties of form, and of political-administrative interaction. The keynote is almost always the delegation of authority and control in the context of geopolitical units of manageable size and conscious identity. Nomenclature-deconcentration, devolution, regionalism, districts, communes, provinces, etc. – is confusing and relatively insignificant, for it varies according to linguistic form and philosophical perception, but the principle is always the same, to 'decongest' the centre and confer some sort of political and administrative autonomy upon the non-central parts of the system. Such arrangements are

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intended – in theory or rhetoric – to supply the inadequacies of the centralised state both as an efficient instrument of development and as a living political organism sensitive to the wants and demands of its citizens.

A central difficulty in debating the issues set out so briefly here, is the lack of 'case material', of information about the attempts made within the new States to resolve some of these internal dilemmas of underdevelopment. Even bad cases make essential reading, for every failed experiment makes a contribution to knowledge; unusual experiments and innovations deserve description and analysis, whatever their ultimate practical impact.

A particularly interesting case study is provided by the introduction in Sri Lanka in 1973 of a 'district political authority system'. It is a case which in itself embraces the major issues identified above, for as an experiment in 'developmental engineering' it addresses itself to two central issues. First, is there a better way to control and direct decision-making about development issues in rural areas than the conventional bureaucratic arrangements have provided? Second, is it possible to achieve a more effective development programme by reasserting the authority of local elected political representatives against the collected weight of the administrative agents of central government?[1] The interest of the case, though, lies not only in the analysis of these questions, but in the nature of the principal evidence which is available as a basis for such analysis. That evidence is the recorded proceedings of a 'Workshop by Government Agents' (in 1975) on the district political authority experiment. The Government Agent, lineal descendent of the former Colonial District Officer, is the principal representative of central government in the Sri Lanka districts. The intended effect of the 1973 reform was to delegate to local politicians responsibility for local decision making in respect of certain developmental activities, a responsibility which had until then been the reserve of either Government Agents and other district officials, or the politicians and officials at the centre. The Workshop Report (WR) is an unusual record, for it conveys the collective views and reactions of a bureaucratic group while itself the object of a major attempt at administrative and political reform, and gives valuable insights into the attitudes of senior bureaucrats to political leadership and political authority, and to the role of administrative officers in development efforts by the State.[2]

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[1] Bradman Weerakoon: *Role of Administrators in a changing Agrarian Situation: the Sri Lanka Experience.*
J.A.O., July, 1977, addresses itself, at least by implication, to the first of these issues, and provides a useful account of the administrative responsibilities and relationships of district officials in Sri Lanka.

[2] The Workshop Report presents only one view of a power triangle in which there are two other sides (the central bureaucrat and the local politician); but rarely is any bureaucratic viewpoint given explicit form, particularly in such a carefully organised and articulate way. The Workshop Report is not merely a record of discussion; it is predominantly a record of research into Government Agent attitudes, based on a series of questionnaires administered and interpreted by other Government Agents, including the Sri Lankan co-author of this paper.

Background to the 1973 reforms

It would be useful to indicate in broad outline the pattern and significant features of regional administration in Sri Lanka prior to the 1973 reforms.[1] In the period between 1802 (the year in which Sri Lanka – then Ceylon – became a British Crown Colony) and 1931 (when the British colonial government relinquished a large share of authority over internal government), the Ceylon Civil Service was virtually in supreme control of the administration of the country. For administrative purposes, the country was divided into Provinces, Districts and Village Headman's Divisions. The Government Agent, in charge of a Province was the focal point of authority in the area and was responsible to the colony's Colonial Secretary for the entire administration of the Province. He was also the superior of various officers, technical and otherwise, posted by various central departments to the Province, and the office of the Government Agent (called the *Kachcheri*) accommodated all or most of the departmental officers at Provincial level.

From 1931 up to about 1973 several changes occurred in the functions and position of the Government Agent in the administrative structure. The number of Government Agents was increased and each was placed in charge of a smaller area than a Province, called the District.[2] This period saw the growth of a number of government departments which established vertical hierarchies from the centre to the field. More and more of the field-level staff in the District struck direct links with their heads of departments in the centre, by-passing the Government Agents' administration and establishing their own departmental offices outside the *Kachcheri* building.

In order to appreciate the developmental implications of these administrative changes it is necessary to focus on some of the central themes of government activity in the country. Food production and rural improvement have been more or less the corner stones of developmental policy in Sri Lanka. Self-sufficiency in rice, which is the staple food of the people, has been one of the main targets. The steep increase in the price of imported rice,[3] resulting in the loss of valuable foreign exchange necessary for the development of the country's economy, made it essential to give food production the highest priority in government investment. The success of a paddy production programme depended on the availability of water, seed, fertilizer, pesticides, etc. at the right time, and nowhere else was a concerted and coordinated programme among government departments such as Irrigation, Agriculture, and Cooperatives more needed. More significantly, coordination of these activities had to be brought about at the level of the farmer, and the district administrative system with the Government Agent at the apex was thought to be the most convenient machinery for the task.

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[1]Our account here relies on Neil Fernando *Regional Administration in Sri Lanka*, pp 9-19 (Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka, 1973).

[2]There are 22 such Districts in Sri Lanka, the average district being more than 750,000 square miles in area.

[3]For instance, in 1973 the country spent 322 thousand million rupees for an imported 338 thousand tons of rice, while in 1974 it spent 798 thousand million rupees on an imported 297 thousand tons of rice (*Statistical Pocket-book of Sri Lanka*, 1975).

By 1966 when the new high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice were being tried out in many Asian countries, Sri Lanka too was hopeful of achieving the Green Revolution. For the first time, perhaps, since independence there was a realisation of the need to gear administration – particularly District Administration – to a production programme. Senior, experienced administrative personnel in the capital were posted to many key offices of Government Agents. An attempt was made to bring about better coordination between the departments involved in food production by giving the Government Agent senior status in each relevant central Department, so strengthening his authority over central staffs in the District. The measures initiated in 1966 represented an attempt to consolidate the co-ordinating role of the Government Agent for development activities particularly in the area of food production, and in many respects these attempts could be considered to be successful. By 1973 however (the year of the District reforms), the institutional position of the Government Agent as the chief co-ordinating officer of the District for developmental functions came to be questioned both as a result of the loss of confidence by the new Government (ULF) which came into power in 1970 in the effectiveness of the measures adopted in 1966 as well as in the ability of the Government Agents to sustain them. But the 1966 measures, which represented a last ditch attempt to prop up a District administrative structure which was on its last legs, must be seen against the growth of central departmental power and the increasing influence of the local politician.

The 1973 reforms

'The District Politicial Authority is something of a Mona Lisa, meaning different things to different people.' (WR, v.)'

The district administrative reforms of 1973 in Sri Lanka represented an attempt to come to terms with the two contending forces of departmental power and the influence of the local politician through a mechanism which produced greater political control of district bureaucracies. A corollary of the object of ensuring greater political control of district administration was to enlist the participation of the people in the process of planning and implementing development projects. The overarching objective was to buttress a weakened 'district system' of government control and implementation.

Two features appear distinct in these reforms. First, in each District, one of the most senior local politicians, belonging to the governing political party/parties was appointed by the Prime Minister as the District Political Authority[1] for two purposes, to give leadership to the Food Drive and to mobilize popular support and cooperation.[2] The second feature of the refoms was the creation of a

[1]The term District Political Authority (DPA) has been given different meanings in goverument documents, and may refer either to the *team* (of Parlimentary M.P's, District representatives of central ministries, and the Government Agent) *or* to the senior District politician appointed to chair the team, *or* to both; for the purposes of this article the most significant usage places emphasis upon the political authority of the Chairman.

[2]According to *Decentralised Decision-making and People's Participation*, a set of guidelines issued by the Prime Minister's Co-ordinating Secretariat, June, 1974.

Decentralised Budget (DB) the funds for which were voted by the central government on the lines of a block grant, with the broad outlines of expenditure being set by the Department of National Planning. In a circular issued to all DPA's under the heading 'The Food Production War' the role of the DPA is outlined as follows: 'The primary function of the DPA is to provide political leadership, guidance, morale and confidence to the 'front-line soldiers', i.e. the farmers and the general public. In order to achieve this, the DPA should have a well-knit team comprising members of the National State Assembly, the Government Agent and the local Heads of Government Departments and Corporations. If the common enemy of starvation and scarcity is to be defeated, every member of the Team must rally round the Political Authority'. The aim was clearly to establish a political leadership for the Food Drive – a leadership that would supersede the weaker existing bureaucratic leadership signified by the Government Agent, and would bring order into a system of district administration which was in a state of disarray and incapable of performing the coordinated role essential for a high priority developmental task such as the Food Drive. The Prime Minister in a speech in September, 1973 said: 'We will have to give political leadership in the implementation of this work . . . regretfully some officials have not extended the cooperation we expected. It may be that they are working to previously set standards and red tape is prevalent. We want to eradicate this'. The expectation was that since political supervision went along with political leadership the possibility of bureaucratic 'sabotage' would be eliminated. Political leadership had to be strengthened because of the ambivalent and neutral attitude that bureaucrats were generally thought to adopt in the context of the country's party political system and because a developmental campaign such as the Food Drive demanded as much total effort and commitment from the bureaucrats as from the people. It was also an objective of political leadership to mobilise the people behind the Food Drive and thereby to fill what was assumed to be a significant lacuna in the strategy adopted in previous programmes.

The attempt to create a formal district political leadership in 1973 was not an exercise in a vacuum. It was rather the culmination of a number of forces that had been at work in the politico-administrative process since the grant of independence in 1948. The power and status of the Member of Parliament in that process had inevitably increased as the combination of universal franchise and scarcity of resources made every activity of government, as the largest purveyor of resources, vulnerable to political 'interference'. Appointments, promotions and transfers in the various government departments and corporations were frequently and increasingly determined in ways which allowed to the Member of Parliament belonging to the party in power an influential role. The extent of this influence became crystal clear when applicants for some posts in government service were required to submit a letter of recommendation from a government MP in their area. The local MP often put pressure on district administrators who were aware that a recalcitrant and unresponsive attitude could result in adverse repercussions on their career interests. The creation of the DPA to some extent formalised a situation that had existed for some time in the Districts.

The 1973 reforms not only emphasise the need to combine reform of the public administration with developmental objectives, but also point to the defects that customarily impede such a combination. The relaxation of financial procedures and the creation of the Decentralised Budget (DB) constituted a significant element in the reforms. The preamble to the section on the DB in the Annual Estimates for 1974 is illuminating: 'The scheme for decentralising the allocation of funds for capital works of a local nature is intended to generate increased production and employment in the rural sector by enlisting the participation of the local people in the planning and implementation of development projects at the local level. Members of Parliament are to assume responsibility for the completion of projects in their electorates expeditiously and to effect economies by enthusing the people to involve themselves in programmes of development. The Planning Ministry will indicate broad national priorities and set out the criteria and guidelines for the admission of investment projects. Work will be undertaken on approved programmes/projects according to local priorities and funds will be easily transferable among projects in the Districts. In 1974, the funds will be utilised for an emergency food production programme and related works. The Ministry of Planning will release funds for any specific work which for special reasons cannot be deferred. The Government Agent who is the Administrative Head for the District will be the Accounting Officer'. This preamble is significant for the light it throws on the thinking behind the DB concept. A direct link is sought to be established between the DB and the objective of securing political leadership for the Food Drive, the DB being regarded as the concrete instrument available to political leadership to mobilise the people for the Food Drive. The DB sought to mark out a deviation from the normal centralised financial procedure of expenditure being itemised and heavily controlled from the centre, with the transfer of money from one project to another becoming an extremely difficult task involving inevitable delays; this reduction of 'red tape' was intended to enable the bureaucratic machine to work at an accelerated pace. It presupposed the existence of a District Plan, which was to be conceived and executed at District level and was to be a means for local people to participate in the process of planning and implementing local development projects.

An Internal Assessment of the 1973 reforms

Considerable light is thrown on the working of the 1973 reforms by the special Workshop of Government Agents, held at Sri Lanka Academy of Administrative Studies in 1973.[1] The Government Agents (GA) were better equipped than most to study the ripples in the pool of district administration caused by the pebble of the District Political Authority system, since they themselves were in the pool up to their necks. The GA felt the consequences of the changes more than any other government official. Their response constitutes invaluable, if qualified evidence of the impact of the reforms.

The assessment of the success or failure of any programme or strategy depends

[1] *The District Political Authority System: Report of a Government Agents' Workshop*, Colombo, 1975 (*Workshop Report*).

on the criteria used as a basis for measurement. In the area of securing political control of the district bureaucracy, which was a necessary concomitant if not an object of the District Political Authority system, two aspects were regarded by the Workshop as significant. First, is the question of political control of the entire district bureaucracy by the district politicians or the DPA; in this regard it is clear that district politicians, particularly those belonging to the national party in power, had begun to interfere in those administrative decisions which profited them and their clients long before 1973, though the district bureaucracy continued to operate on the basis of policy directions and guide-lines originating from the centre. For instance, in one of the traditional spheres of district bureaucratic activity, such as land allocation, the basic requirements laid down by the Land Commissioner's Department were fulfilled but it was an open secret that the local MP or the local organizer of the governing party had an influential say in selecting those to whom land was allotted. Even with the establishment of the DPA system, it was basically this type of political 'interference' and not directions on policy or day-to-day matters that formed the core of political control of district bureaucracy, though in the initial period of uncertainty, the DPA attempted, sometimes successfully, to issue policy directions. One instance of this type of 'policy direction' was the decision taken by the DPA in Matale district to direct that all persons who drew their rice rations from private authorized dealers should henceforth draw their rations from the co-operative stores. This was a policy decision that clearly fell within the purview of the Ministry of Food and Trade, and the Food Commissioner; but the decision of the DPA was carried out since the Food Commissioner neither approved of or rescinded the decision. Similarly, there was an instance where the DPA played the role of an executive in day-to-day administration, calling for reports from individual officials. But these instances were relatively rare, and occurred during a period when almost everyone seemed to have been uncertain of the powers and responsibilities of the DPA.[1] The Workshop Report explains this uncertainty: 'The available circulars indicate that the authority of the DPA had been specified only as regards the Food Production Drive, the Decentralised Budget and Land Reform. In actual working, however, the power the DPA exercises or attempts to exercise, is much greater. That is why the GA were unanimous in asking for a set of rules, and a definition of the respective roles of the GA and the DPA'[2]. But participant experience was that although the Government did not make a formal definition of these roles, it was becoming established practice to both the DPAs and the GA that the role of the DPA should be confined to the disbursement of DB funds and supervision of the implementation of projects so financed. The fact that some of the DPA's happened to be Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the Central Government was probably a significant practical factor in this stabilisation of the DPA's relations with the Central Government and the District administrations. Whatever the reason, the GA were in no doubt of the result: 'The creation of the DPA has to a considerable extent devolved political power and authority from the centre to the DPAs and MPs at District Level . . . there has also

[1]'The new system was set up more or less over the phone – with barely any reference to the Ministry of Home Affairs whose representative is the GA. Naturally this led the 22 GA to adopt 22 different approaches' (WR III, 14-15).

[2]WR I, 4.

been a decrease of power and control of the Ministries and Departments at the centre in relation to the administration at District level'.[1]

A second aspect of political control was raised by the issue of leadership of the Food Drive. In the type of multi-party system prevalent in Sri Lanka, political leadership has inevitably come to be interpreted in practice as leadership by the governing party rather than a broad-based leadership accepted by every political party. In that sense, the leadership that emerged for the Food Drive was partisan, and the exercise of people's participation in the process of preparing and implementing the District Plan was inevitably a means of bringing political credit to the Government side. Though in theory every member of the National State Assembly, whatever his political identity, was entitled to be a member of the DPA team, in practice the place of opposition MPs was taken by a nominee of the governing party, invariably the chief organiser of the governing party in the area. The local political 'chief' was usually a senior member of the National State Assembly belonging to the governing party. In districts where there were no government members of the National State Assembly, the DPA was normally nominated from the political leadership of a neighbouring 'government' district, so the DPA system was manifestly representative only of the national governing party.

In all districts, political control not only of the composition of the DPA but of other organisations determined the character of the participatory exercise. One of the chief objectives of the reforms was a planning exercise at grass-roots level in which the people's representatives should participate through such institutions as the Rural Development Societies and Agricultural Productivity Committees, and where the proposals submitted by these representative institutions should be filtered to the DPA through a local MP or a nominee of the governing party. But in practice, due to the politicisation of these various institutions, the individuals who comprised them were either the direct nominees of a local MP or government party organiser, or had the 'blessing' of these critical controllers. There were instances where the proposals submitted to the DPA by the MP or the Government Party nominee were those recommended by their party divisional committees. The Workshop Report lists the following two factors as the main disadvantages of the DPA system: '. . . (d) political ties in determining electoral priorities which supersede the need for optimum allocation and use of resources through Regional Planning and Budgeting processes; (e) unrepresented social, economic and political groups being denied an impartial hearing'.[2]

Yet there was an attempted justification for this one-dimensional exercise, namely, that as the Prime Minister stated in 1972, with particular reference to 'suspect' bureaucrats, one could not allow soldiers to fire in opposite directions in time of war. This dictum applied as much as to the bureaucrats as to those politicians who were involved in the process of plan preparation and implementation. And it has been

[1] *Ibid*, Introduction, vi.
[2] WR, Introduction, iii.

admitted that within its limited framework the DPA system evoked a fair amount of local enthusiasm for the Food Drive. The Workshop Report states that Government Agents 'rejected the view that politicians . . . are only interested in furthering their own interests or the interests of their relatives or their Party followers . . .'[1] which is an indication that the 'one-sided' exercise took on additional dimensions. Whether local enthusiasm and participation in the formulation and implementation of plans at local level, within the political limits that have been indicated, would have been possible through a purely bureaucratic district leadership bereft of an administrative machinery for effectively exerting local pressures and demands, is anyone's guess, but the GA's admitted that the DPA had put some political muscle into administrative tasks that would normally be difficult to implement.[2] The District administrative machinery, prior to the reforms of 1973, did in fact provide certain official organs through which the voices of the local politicians, the representatives of local bodies and the private agricultural sector could be heard, and their demands and pressures be brought to bear on state activity in the District. These organs were the District Co-ordinating Committee, and the District Agricultural Committee (and its sub-committees) which were both chaired by the Government Agent. But with the decline of the Government Agent's role as the chief coordinating officer in all vital activities affecting the man in the District, these coordinating bodies began to lose the dynamism which had characterised them in the past. While the importance of these organizations cannot be underestimated even after the reforms of 1973, they had distinct limitations in the fields of local project formulation, review and implementation.[3] The lack of funds, and the authority that goes with the allocation of such funds to call the spending departments to account for the allocations, was a significant limitation which in many instances reduced the work of these organisations to 'talking shop' exercises.

In 1973, for the first time in the history of budgeting in Sri Lanka, a substantial slice from the central budget,[4] was distributed among the 22 Districts and the GA, who were made Accounting Officers for the expenditure of the money, were given considerable discretion to spend the money on capital works of a local nature within the broad objectives spelt out by the Department of National Planning and the Treasury. This cut a lot of the red tape that bound the Districts to the central government departments and it compelled the departments to delegate more responsibility to their officers at District level; without such delegation the preparation of estimates and feasibility reports on items selected by the DPA and financed by the DB could not have been undertaken.

The DPA system produced a mechanism to call the local administrative heads (of central departments) to account for the funds allocated from the DB and to review closely the implementation of projects. It is noteworthy that in Matale District (where Mr Gamage was Government Agent) each Government MP had

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[2] *Ibid*, II, 12.
[3] *Ibid*, I, 31.
[1] Workshop Report, IV, 33.
[2] The DB in 1974 was 175 million rupees; in 1975, 125 million rupees; in 1976, 350 million rupees; and in 1977, 300 million rupees.

meetings regularly with the respective local administrative heads in respect of work in his 'constituency': apparently this practice was simultaneously developing in a number of other districts. The local MP began to feel a sense of personal responsibility for spending money from the DB in his constituency as this became an effective instrument to fulfil at least some of his promises to his constituents. He found that if the local problems came within the ambit of the DB he was on very certain ground in promising to solve them. The local administrative heads responded readily to requests to attend meetings of the DPA or its electoral sub-committee meetings, rather than to attend meetings of the District Coordinating Committee chaired by the Government Agent – a significant reason being that an antagonistic DPA or Government MP was a more serious impediment to his career prospects than an antagonistic Government Agent. Project formulation and execution at local level under the DPA system was becoming a more meaningful and effective exercise. Within its own limitations, public participation came closer to reality: 'All the GA's have stated that, through their local political representatives, the people have come closer to administration'.[1]

Concluding Remarks

According to their declared purposes, the 1973 reforms were the result of the realisation of the need to give effective leadership to the Food Drive. In reality, they represented a major attempt to achieve a breakthrough in a bureaucratic machinery which was largely working at a 'colonial' tempo too often oblivious of the political, social and economic changes that were occurring around it. The massive landslide at the elections of 1970 which brought the United Left Party into power, and the attempt made in 1971 by a group of insurgents, which consisted largely of disaffected youth, to overthrow the Government forcibly, were events of serious political significance which conveyed a 'message of impatience' to national political leaders. In such a crisis, this leadership began to feel acutely a sense of frustration with a sluggish bureaucracy. Political involvement with the administrative processes connected with the vital aspects of resource allocation and expenditure at local levels appeared to be an area where the Government politician could do something visible for his constituents. The establishment of the DPA system not only enabled the Government politician to decide his own priorities for his constituency within the scope of the DB, but it also opened the door to his supporters to throw up ideas which formed the core of local level projects, and to follow closely the implementation of projects in the constituency. It snapped a number of apron-strings which tied the District to central political and bureaucratic control and made the District bureacracy more flexible and malleable. It served to fill a much felt gap in district coordination which was an absolute necessity in enterprises like crash food production programmes, which depended on the cooperative and integrated action of several Government departments. And it achieved at least an element, albeit indirect, of popular participation in the Food Drive.

There are, however, certain aspects of the DPA system which could yet be improved, to achieve the best results. There is no doubt that the ideology of democratic

[1]Workshop Report, V, 43.

planning has loomed large in the thinking behind the DPA system. If the infrastructure provided by the DPA system for democratic planning and participation is to sustain itself, the need to offset the heavy bias towards the dominant Government politician and to arrive at a more balanced and representative arrangement has to be realised; the chances of the DPA system in its present form succeeding under a governing party with a majority any more slender than the ULF[1] gained in the elections in 1970 appears to be small. If the Members of Parliament of non-governing parties could have been accommodated on the DPA platform, much of the disenchantment with the DPA system in opposition political circles, and their supporters among the masses, could have been avoided, and a greater degree of democratic participation could have been achieved. This, however, is a remedy that goes well beyond administrative reorganisation and lies at the heart of inter-party relations in Sri Lanka. And it may be that the successful impetus of the DPA derived precisely from the freedom of action guaranteed by the careful exclusion of oppositional elements.

A different possibility is that this administrative innovation in 'district development' could be extended by making it possible for larger chunks of the Central Budget to be given to the districts to undertake bigger projects than at present while ensuring a greater degree of harmony and coordination among the departments involved with the project. The 1973 reforms seem to point the way to that genuine financial decentralisation which is the lifeblood of any institutional decentralisation, whatever its political form.

It may be that both these suggestions are optimistic in tone, given the realities of politics, and the evident reluctance of central governments to permit a genuine decentralisation of power and resources. Moreover, political innovations of the 1973 kind are subject to changing political views in accordance with fluctuations in national political control. Yet an interesting postscript to this article is provided by the change in national political leadership in the recent (July, 1977) election. In this election the ULF lost control of government to the major opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), which returned 140 of the 168 Members of Parliament. The UNP has already declared its intention to retain a system of political control of decentralised decision making through the creation of District Ministries.

The relevant statement reads:[2]
My Government will enable and ensure the participation of the people in the process of Administration by decentralising the administrative set-up to the village level and making the people partners in the planning, organisation and implementation of policy. The Government recognises the importance of Local Government as an institution representative of the people.

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[1]The United Left Party (ULF) is a coalition of three parties and won more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in the 1970 general elections. But in 1977 the ULF suffered a crushing electoral defeat.

[1]Speech to the Throne, August 4th, 1977.

My Government will revitalise the Local Government System by:

a Creating a net-work of Local Government Bodies throughout the Island with larger areas of operation and more responsible functions;

b Providing the resources both financial and otherwise by allocating monies from the Consolidated Fund to Local Bodies;

c Making provision for the election of Heads of Local Bodies by all the voters of the respective areas of authority.

The Government will also establish Development Councils at the Electoral[1] and District levels for the purpose of co-ordinating and directing development programmes.

Electoral Development Councils will be headed by the Member of Parliament and will consist of elected Members and officials of the Local Bodies and Government officials in the Electorate.

District Development Councils will be headed by a District Minister of State who will not be a member of the Cabinet and will consist of Members of Parliament, elected Heads of Local Bodies and Government officials.[2]

It seems likely that the basic principles of financial and decision making decentralization introduced by the DPA System have come to stay in Sri Lanka, and may well survive changes of political regime because they are addressed to a set of relationships which will always be crucial in attempts by the state to achieve economic and social development.

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[1]'Electoral level' = parliamentary constituency.

[2]Emphasis added.

Gezira Scheme Developments FAO Fertilizer Programme for 1977-1978*

TAHA EL JACK TAHA**

The Sudan Gezira Board, the Agricultural Research Corporation and the Soil Survey Department, were following closely the success achieved by the FAO Fertilizer Programme since its inception in 1961 in East and West Africa, Asia, the Near East, North Africa and Latin America by dint of financial support from the world fertilizer industry and contributions from donor governments.

The Sudan Gezira Board took the initiative in 1969 in making formal approaches through official channels to FAO for admission to the FAO Fertilizer Programme. However, two fundamental factors were responsible for the Sudan Gezira Board's attitude:

1 The conduction of semi-detailed soil surveys in parts of the Gezira and Managil on an area of 600,000 Feddans between 1963/70 whereby detailed information on land classes and soil fertility was collected.
2 The set up of an agricultural extension service within the Sudan Gezira Board and the training of staff and tenant-farmers in agricultural extension methods.

FAO responded favourably to the Sudan Gezira Board's approaches by sending, in Feb., 1969, Dr L. T. Kadri then Regional Soil Scientist in the Near East Region and the Sudan Gezira Board's intention to have the FAO Fertilizer Programme extended to the Sudan was brought into focus. The correlation of farm management, soils and fertility surveys and efficient fertilizer application by the tenant farmers for boosting agricultural productivity of cotton and food crops was the central theme of meetings.

In February, 1970, FAO communicated with the Ministry of National Planning and the Ministry of Agriculture to the effect that the Danish Representative to FAO had indicated that his Government would be interested in financing a project

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*This paper which was originally presented at the Third Annual Agricultural Conference of the Agricultural Research Corporation on 29th-31st May, 1977 is published by kind courtesey of Professor Abdalla Ahmed Abdalla, Minister of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources and President of the Third Annual Agricultural Conference.

**The Author is Manager, Planning and Development Department, Sudan Gezira Board.

in the Sudan on 'Fertilizer Demonstrations and Pilot Schemes Programme' and enclosed a draft project for discussion with the agencies concerned.

Early in 1976, the Danish Government indicated its interest to financing a Fertilizer Programme in the Sudan and in compliance with this sent a preparatory mission to the Sudan. The mission's terms of reference were:

i to hold discussions with the Sudanese authorities on the feasibility of a National Fertilizer Programme and related inputs project with a view to preparing a detailed proposal for implementation under the FAO/Danida Co-operative Programme.

ii Define with the Sudanese authorities the crops and areas of operation of the project.

iii Conduct demonstrations and trials in farmers' fields using available research results.

iv Define areas where input distribution and credit pilot schemes would be established after the first year of the project.

The preparatory mission visited the Sudan in May, 1976 and toured the Gezira and other irrigation and rain-fed Schemes before submitting its report to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. A final meeting was held at the Ministry of Agriculture in May, 1976 during which the Fertilizer Programme and related in-puts Scheme was approved. This was followed in February, 1977 by a signed plan of operation which was transmitted to FAO and the Danish Government signalling official ratification of the project documents and paving the way for its implementation in the 1977/78 agricultural season.

Extended Plan of Operation

The Fertilizer Programme which was originally intended to operate in the Gezira Scheme was revised with the consent of the Donor Government to cover the new Wadi Halfa Scheme and parts of Khartoum, Nile and Southern Kordofan Provinces. The donation of $(US) 593,839 extending over 5 years covers the salaries of one Senior Expert in soil fertility and fertilizer use, three associate experts and part-time consultants on distribution, credit and marketing in addition to the cost of fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, motor-transport and equipments.The counter-part fund was included in the 6-year Development Plan totalling Ls. 255,000.

Steering Committee

The Steering Committee drawn up from the Agricultural Research Corporation, the Soil Survey Department, The Sudan Gezira Board and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources is the technical and administrative counterpart of the fertilizer programme and related in-puts project. The Steering Committee was formed in 1969 and has been responsible for keeping the project alive over the past years while it remained in formative shape.

The Significance of the Project

The vicious circle of low-yields and low returns to the tenant-farmers and the Sudanese nation still remains to be broken. The efficient use of fertilizers through the education and training of tenant-farmers and farm labourers now lies within easy reach after the Gezira Scheme and Managil South-Western Extension have reached the pinnacle of horizontal expansion (1.8 million feddans of cropped land annually and 0.3 million feddans in fallow in the Gezira Scheme only*). The key to the situation is the vertical improvement of yield per unit area of land and per cubic metre of irrigation water and this depends principally on efficient use of fertilizers and related agricultural in-puts. The presence of massive technical data on land classes, soil fertility, crop husbandry practices, water use and positive response of cotton, sorghum, wheat, rice and vegetables to fertilizer use makes the success of the FAO Fertilizer Programme axiomatic.

The implementation of the project will also help in filling a felt gap relating to the economics of fertilizer use and the calculation of the value/cost ratio to the tenant-farmers in irrigation and rain-fed schemes. Another advantage of the project is that it is coinciding with the birth of the seed industry at the FAO project located at Sennar and at the proposed seed farm at Wad El Nur under the 6-year Development Plan 1977/78-1982/83. However, it is hoped that these two seed propagation centres in addition to the traditional seed propagation areas in the Gezira Scheme will provide abundant improved seeds of nutritive food and fodder crops for tenant demonstrators covered by the project during its five years of operation.

The Distribution and Credit Phase of the Project

The second phase of the field programme is a pilot scheme (on fertilizer distribution and credit) intended to develop a fertilizer marketing system for areas in which the programme is operating.[2] The Sudan Gezira Board and the Agricultural Bank are today the major procurers of fertilizers and the encouragement of licensed local agents operating under the Agricultural Bank's supervision, for stocking and retailing of fertilizers for tenants food and fodder crops in the same areas, is an end in view. The terms under which these licensed local agents operate, i.e. whether on a cash or credit basis under the supervision of the Agricultural Bank and the Sudan Gezira Board and the other scheme managements have to be negotiated. Further, the role of the Agricultural Bank in collecting the proceeds from the sale of fertilizers to tenant demonstrators and setting up a revolving fund for replenishment of fertilizer stocks and providing tenants with fertilizer on credit in subsequent years, has to be thrashed out at a joint meeting between the Sudan Gezira Board and Scheme Managements and the Agricultural Bank. The tenant-farmers will, for certain, acquire experience in fertilizer distribution, marketing and credit and their multi-purpose cooperatives will assume this role at one time in the future.

**I feddan* = 1.038 *acres* = 0.42 *hectares* (Ed.).

[1] Gezira/Managil Scheme, New Wadi Halfa Scheme, Khartoum, Nile and Southern Kordofan Provinces.

The fertilizer distribution and pilot schemes project could be expanded to include other production in-puts, e.g. improved seeds, pesticides, adapted technologyand marketing of agricultural products. The basic objective of the project is to weld effective cooperation between tenant-farmers, the extension service, fertilizer distributors and the Agricultural Bank in connection with food and fodder crops. This will tend to encourage the tenant-farmers to take kindly to fertilizer use in accordance with research findings and in turn enhance the agricultural productivity of food and fodder crops providing that the value/cost ratio is attractive as a result of favourable prices for their products and a sound agricultural credit system.

The Agreed Plan of Operation for the 1977/78 Season

Dr Klaus Zschernitz, Regional Leader FAO Fertilizer Programme for Africa stationed in Nairobi, Kenya, visited the Sudan during April, 1977. He conducteda training course for instructors at the Faculty of Agriculture, Shambat, on 15th and 16th April, 1977, covering the following disciplines:
Agricultural extension, horticulture, plant protection and provincial affairs.

Dr Zschernitz moved to Barakat on 17 April to conduct a similar trainingcourse for the Sudan Gezira Board's field staff and extension officers covering the history of the fertilizer programme since its inception in 1961, general plant nutrition followed by a slide show of the Fertilizer Programme in Africa. In the second day of the course Dr Zschernitz explained to the participants the recommendations of the Fertilizer Programme Steering Committee's meeting on the evening of 17 April, 1977 on selection of the demonstration plots and discussed with the participants the details of the crop sheets. He also explained fertilizer types and various methods of application and economic evaluation of fertilizer use.

The 500 demonstration plots of cotton, dura (sorghum) wheat, rice and vegetables were selected in the south, centre and Messelamia Groups on the Gezira Scheme, for efficient application of fertilizer with recommended improved cultural practices in the current 1977/78 season.

The working plan was endorsed by the participants. The field staff and the extension officers who attended Dr Zschermitz's course will act as instructors for the rest of the field staff, extensionists and tenant-farmers on the commencement of the project at the start of the 1977/78 agricultural season and the project will have a multiplier effect, it is hoped, over the years that lie ahead.*

*The Sudan Gezira Board owes an incalculable debt of gratitude to FAO and especially to Mr Mathieu, Manager of the Fertilizer Programme, FAO and his colleagues Dr Paul Tag, Dr Klaus Zschermitz, and Dr L. T. Kadri, and last but not least to the Danish International Development Agency whose generously donated funds made possible the implementation of the Fertiliser Programme in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan after a lengthy expectancy.

Quarterly Notes

OXFORD UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM - Africa in the colonial period

The Oxford University Inter-faculty Committee for African Studies held the fourth of its symposia on *Africa in the Colonial Period* at Trinity College on 17-18, April 1978. The title was 'The Transfer of Power in Africa: the Legal Arrangements'. There were some thirty participants, mostly from Britain many with relevant African judicial and legal experience while others were historians, social scientists and plain administrators. The Convenor was Dr Alan Milner, Fellow and Law Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford.

The symposium restricted itself to British 'Colonies'; nor was it possible to give full coverage to all these. The programme was divided into sessions covering:

- Constitutional Models
- The Protection of Freedom
- The Integration of Legal and Judicial Systems.

Papers were presented by speakers whose African and subsequent experience provided more than adequate material. Consequently few speakers allowed sufficient time for discussion. Nevertheless, without any prodding from the various distinguished Chairmen, there were always useful and constructive contributions from the floor and discussions continued in the congenial surroundings of the College Beer Cellar and Hall.

In a brief note it is impossible to comment fully and fairly on all contributions, but some subjective observations may be permitted. Professor Phillips' resume of events in Kenya in the 1940's was just what one would expect from the author of a far-sighted report on the integration of legal and judicial systems, most of whose recommendations have since been implemented. Then we had Dr Morris' lively account of experiences as Local Courts Adviser in Uganda; Mr A. Webbs' lucid description of the legal aspects of Kenya's land problems (not restricted to the over-publicised 'White Highlands'); Sir Bryan Robert's controversial views on the machinations of capitalists and their effect on human rights in Central Africa; the ingenuity of legal draftsmen described in Mr Bennion's account of the first Ghana Republican Constitution; the myth of 'the Westminster Model' destroyed by Mr de Winton; Mr Marshall's fascinating story of efforts in Nigeria to integrate Muslim, Pagan and 'English' Law, which more than compensated for his earlier pedestrian descriptions of the Minorities Problem in Nigeria. And there were always comments from Sir Ian Lewis.

We were indebted to Professors Kirkwood and Allott for their introductions

putting the otherwise rather specialised subject matter into a broader perspective. We were especially fortunate to have Professor Ghai – a Kenyan recently translated from Dar-es-Salaam to Warwick University to sum up. His breadth of view and refreshing iconoclasm left fewer grounds for self-congratulation or complacency about the job the British had cone, or for that matter, their successors are now doing. He did however agree with Professor Kirkwood that the rich detail of participants' experience disclosed during proceedings, was worthy of record. So we set off homewards chastened but enlightened and encouraged.

(contributed by B. J. J. Stubbings)

SINGAPORE - A City Kept Clean

Singapore is internationally known as one of the cleanest cities in the world.The campaign to keep the republic's environment clean and green goes as far back as 1968 when a month-long 'Keep Singapore Clean' campaign was launched to generate public awareness of the dangers of littering. The Environmental PublicHealthAct, passed in January, 1969, provided for a fine for littering. Litter is defined as any solid waste discarded on roads and public places and into drains.

The number of prosecutions for littering cigarette butts, packages, plastic bags, bus tickets, waste papers, fruit cores and peels, match boxes, cans, bottles and straws, declined from 9,578 in 1972 to 3,823 last year. The average fine imposed increased from $27 to $35.* The maximum fine imposed increased from $45 to $100.

Littering fines totalled $138,413 last year. In addition, $47,835 was collected from 674 lorry drivers for scattering earth on the roads.

An enforcement 'blitz' is staged from time to time in places where littering is prevalent. The ministry also puts up some 4,500 wire-meshed baskets and 550 standing-type bins at bus stops and other strategic places.

The litter problem can only be solved with the full co-operation of the public. They must make it a habit to refrain from throwing anything in public places and drains. An unpleasant alternative is to impose the maximum fine of $500 on recalcitrants. Schools should continue to promote good social habits among children. But we all must work towards a truly litter-free Singapore without continuous reliance on strict enforcement.

(Source: *Urban Innovation Abroad*, published by the Council for International Urban Liaison, Washington D.C.)

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*$1.00(Singapore) = $0.43(U.S.) or 22½p.

Book Reviews

Urbanisation in the Middle East, V. F. COSTELLO; *Cambridge University Press,* 1977; Index, pp 121; £4.95 (hardback), £1.95 (paperback).

More than half of the world's population now lives in the developing countries and by the end of this century it is likely that this proportion will have grown to two-thirds. Yet already towns and cities of all sizes throughout the developing countries seem to be bursting at their seams, and the rapid urbanisation which is taking place is bringing with it a host of planning problems. The scale of some of these problems – the housing problem for example – is frightening indeed, yet in many ways the most frightening aspect of all is that urbanisation in the Third World seems still to be in its early stages. The towns and cities of the industrialised countries, in general, are now experiencing only modest rates of growth. This has led to the conclusion among students of the city that probably the Western world is at, or very nearly at, the end of a major cycle of urbanisation. The developing countries, in contrast, seem to be in the first stages of a cycle of urbanisation very much more massive than any that has been previously experienced in human history. And at the present time it is not possible to say when, and in what circumstances, this cycle may end. The awful prospect is, of course, that the further progress of urbanisation in the Third World may involve little more than an intensification of misery for the mass of present and future urban populations, since in contrast to the urban experience in the industrialised countries, urban growth in the Third World is resting upon a base of deficient resources, especially industrial resources. The reasons for rapid urban growth are primarily demographic and lie essentially in high rates of natural increase of urban populations being coupled with heavy in-migration from rural areas. There is little positive relationship between urbanisation and industrialisation.

The urban experience of the Middle East is of particular interest in this context because this is the one major area of the Third World which, because of oil revenues, can be considered wealthy in the financial sense. All too often in the developing countries, planners are being faced with problems made virtually insoluble through lack of resources. Here the basic problem is not lack of material resources but if anything, at least for the time being, a superabundance of financial resources which itself is causing problems in terms of the skilled manpower necessary to make the best use of them. In these circumstances, Dr Costello's book is to be welcomed as a valuable review of major developments in the urban picture of the Middle East in recent years. He does not neglect the historical aspect, indeed one of his chapters is devoted to a survey of pre-industrial urban society. The bulk of the book, however, concerns modern problems of urban development and their background in both economic and social terms. As a geographer, Dr Costello also attempts to

compare theoretical work on the form and structure of cities, which has been derived essentially from the study of cities in industrialised economies, with the actual patterns which are developing in the cities of his own region, but this kind of comparison occupies only a minor part of the book. In its pages, much of Dr Costello's own local field work comes through, especially work upon Kashan in Iran, and there are also several case studies of other cities used to illustrate particular points in the argument. The case studies, derived from geographical field work, are perhaps the major strength of the book, since it is difficult to generalise about urban growth in countries as widely different as Israel and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey and it is equally difficult to compare developments in urban giants such as Cairo with those in small local towns near the other end of the urban hierarchy.

This is not a long book, only 121 pages, and it deserves to be widely read as a brief but clear and non-technical survey of the major issues involved in rapid urban growth in what has become a highly-important Third-World region. In spite of all its riches, urban problems still abound in the Middle East, and perhaps a reading of Dr Costello's survey would lead students of urbanisation in other parts of the Third World to conclude that the true way ahead must lie in the widespread exploitation of small-scale opportunities for improvement through the mobilisation of indigenous resources rather than the centralised conception of grandiose schemes, based at least in part upon the urban experience of the industrialised countries, which sometimes bear little relevance to local circumstances.

D. J. DWYER

Assessing Village Labour Situations in Developing Countries, JOHN CONNELL and MICHAEL LIPTON; *Oxford University Press,* 1977; pp 180; £3.95.

This book is primarily about field research methodologies for assessing rural labour use. While it contains some interesting ideas, it is a book which due to its style and organisation is difficult to read and which fails to develop points of potential interest while giving undue space to what is obvious or trivial. Michael Lipton's customary succinctness is lacking. While at a conceptual level the authors make an important point in rejecting the use of the employment/unemployment dichotomy in situations of household-employment, preferring to focus on such concepts as labour utilisation and productivity, the subsequent analysis is confused by an apparently felt need which pervades the book from the outset to justify the concept of village studies. The authors do not confine themselves to a straightforward analysis of methodologies of data collection and analysis for purposes of studying rural labour utilisation in developing countries, but add to this the tasks of justifying, first, village studies *per se* and secondly, the crucial role which they assign to village studies in the study of rural labour use. After reading the book I still had no precise conception of what a 'village study' is. Furthermore, the authors on several occasions overreach themselves in claiming that certain types of data can only be satisfactorily obtained through village studies when this is not necessarily so (for example, with respect to obtaining information to explain 'decisions such as whether to weed once or twice, whether to use some or all children in the fields,

rather than let them go to school' (page 31). This is a book written from a position *parti déjà pris* and as such it is much less objective in the analysis of possible methods of data collection and analysis than it might have been. (Indeed, relatively little is said about data analysis, the book is mainly about data collection.) One would have expected a more objective and systematic analysis to begin with a discussion of the possible *objectives* of analysing 'rural labour utilisation' and then to have proceeded to a listing and analysis of alternative methodologies, tried or propsed, for obtaining and analysing the data required to meet the various specified objectives. In fact a brief discussion of objectives for studying rural labour utilisation is not introduced until pages 30 and 31 and then is both confused and incomplete. While alternatives to village studies (e.g. purposeful or random sample household budget surveys, not necessarily 'village focussed', and farm management studies) are referred to *en passant*, these are not given balanced treatment either as possibly more efficient means for studying certain aspects of rural resource use or as the primary sources from which parts of what are claimed as 'village studies' methodology are derived. The fact that in some parts of Africa village population clusters do not exist is also mentioned (page 15) but its implications are not discussed. The imprtance of baseline surveys in new areas is mentioned, but there is only a brief and again confused discussion of the possible objectives and content of these surveys (page 30). Of the final recommendations some are interesting but others are inconclusive and/or unsubstantiated. For example, the recommendations include the suggestion that in areas where there are no highly-peaked seasonal uses of labour, labour use data might be collected from individual households for three days per fortnight in order to spread data collection resources more widely across villagers and villages. However, no explanation is provided as to the uses to which this type of data might be put, nor of how it would then be possible to obtain accurate labour productivity data for the individual households. This is especially surprising in view of the earlier emphasis not only on the importance of productivity data but on identifying and explaining variations in productivity between households.

Although not stated explicitly Connell and Lipton appear to imply that it is only through village studies that the in-depth understanding of local situations that can derive from relatively long association with respondents may be obtained. This of course is not true for much of the understanding of local situations that can derive from long association may be obtained through working with case-study *households* not necessarily selected on a *village* basis. For example, a decision may be taken to study a particular rural economy. After a base-line survey has been completed, case-study households may be selected for in-depth study. These may be selected on the basis of various criteria, depending on the study's objectives, such as economic status or whether the households operate particular productive enterprises of special interest (for instance a new cash crop). Whether the case-study households are located in one or more villages within the study area, and their distribution between villages, *may* be incidental rather than fundamental to the study methodology. Connell and Lipton mention again somewhat *en passant*, the importance of village studies in providing the opportunity to study the local factors determining

distribution of access to resources. In my view this is the most important contribution to understanding the local determinants of rural resource allocation that can be obtained from the village-based (as opposed to household-based) study. As such it is a pity that the authors did not elaborate further on this point: what sorts of information need to be sought and how may they be obtained in order to enhance our understanding of the distribution of access to resources? And how much variation between areas is there likely to be in the type of questions that need to be asked? And for different sets of study objectives how might the information on distribution that is obtained be incorporated into the final analysis? Unfortunately, these issues are inadequately dealt with.

As it stands this book can best be used as a (biased) base-line survey of possible approaches to data collection in rural areas. The index is quite detailed and so is the bibliography, although the latter reveals some surprising omissions: for example, in view of the authors' emphasis on the importance of testing the relative accuracy of different recall periods it is surprising to find no reference to Malcolm Hall's pioneering work in Uganda; and in view of the importance they attach to re-survey it is equally surprising to find no reference to the important re-surveys conducted by Scarlett Epstein and Margaret Haswell in villages in India and the Gambia.

DIANA HUNT

Cases and Materials on Planning Law, MICHAEL PURDUE; *Sweet and Maxwell*, London, 1977; pp 550; £10.50 (paperback), £15.50 (hardback).

Mr Purdue's book represents a very valiant, and seemingly successful, attempt to collate, classify and comprehend the important elemnets of that vast body of authoritative pronounements which collectively constitute the British planning law. In his introduction the author explains that it is his intention and hope to provide a text useful to the student and practitioner alike – one that will serve equally as both 'guide and referencer'. He has undertaken a monumental task and it would be presumptuous of me (as an American lawyer whose experience has concentrated on the planning problems of developing countries) to pronounce judgement on the degree to which he has achieved his aims. All that I would say is that the book seems to organize and explain its complicated subject – or, perhaps, multiplicity of subjects – very well. The fundamental concepts are presented as clearly as the existing state of the law permits, and Mr Purdue's annotations are helpful and informative. If anything of importance has been omitted, it does not leap at once to my, admittedly, untutored, eye.

The book does not – and, indeed, does not seek to – enter the arena of legal-philosophical debate about the future of planning in Britain (although it faithfully chronicles past debates which have contributed to the present legal prescriptions). However, both as 'guide and a referencer' of existing law it should be a welcome addition to the library of anyone whose interests include the mysteries of planning law and practice.

From my own point of view, there is another fascination about this book. That is

the way in which it tells the story of Britain's continuous, and continuing, effort to come up with an equitable and workable legal prescription for planning. Over the years British planning acts have been exported to all corners of the globe, usually with little thought given to their local applicability. In earlier days this was done by colonial officials for understandable, if not always commendable, reasons. But the process goes on in the independent former colonies. Perhaps the most recent example is Malaysia's adoption, in 1976, of a town and country planning act modelled on Britain's 1971 version. Most of these attempts to transfer the British planning system have proven signally unsuccessful. In this connection Mr Purdue's book provides a valuable 'case study' of the British model.

As a comprehensive description of the planning law which carries the genuine, 'Made in Britain' label it should be required reading for any government proposing to adopt a form of the British legislation. It seems to me that no one can come away from *Cases and Materials on Planning Law* with any illusions about the degree of difficulty involved in trying to recreate a planning system through adoption of a planning law.

The point is made in several ways. First it dramatically demonstrates the complexity of the British law. The statutes themselves are only the tip of an iceberg of legal pronouncements of varying degrees of authority. Judicial decisions interpret the statutory language, and the regulations made under it. They also apply to the statutory scheme certain judge-made rules relating to such matters as procedural fairness, the role of the courts, compensation formulae and the like. The statutory language is further interpreted and elucidated by a vast mass of administrative orders, circulars, recommendations and requirements which may often take on the force of law. The whole system is constantly under critical analysis by public commissions, non-public organizations and private individuals whose comments appear in white papers, reports and journal articles. While these do not have the force of law, they can be influential in determining interpretations or alterations made or accepted by the authorities. They cannot be ignored. In this manner Mr Purdue paints a vivid picture of the way in which the bare words and phrases of a statute gradually gain import and meaning through use and interpretation within a given national context. The British planning system was not only 'Made in Britain'; it was made for Britain, as well. It is no abstract model of an ideal system. This is not to say, however, that there is nothing to be learned from the British experience. There is a great deal. And a second reason for including Mr Purdue's book on the 'required reading' list is its clear and useful exposition of the way in which Britain has struggled, and continues to struggle, with some of the fundamental legal concepts of equity when dealing – as planning must inevitably deal – with property rights. It records the gradual, and by no means uninterrupted, movement away from a position of accepting a landowner's right to the development value of his land as a part of his title. This movement is still going on. An attempt in 1947 to nationalize all development values having proven only partially acceptable, the position now is illogical, but understandable in the context of the fluctuating national political scene in Britain, where the two major parties are deeply divided on the issue. Nevertheless, on the conceptual level, the British

debate on this, and other basic questions of the relationship between the individual and the state, has been clearly and publicly argued. On the conceptual level, it may well have relevance and value to planning in other nations. But there it stops. The British solutions to these issues – to the extent that solutions have been found – may or may not be applicable elsewhere. The specific prescriptions used to translate these solutions into practice almost certainly will not.

There is one more reason for urging Mr Purdue's book on countries considering the adoption of town and country planning legislation. This is not what the book says, but what it does not say. With the exception of a few comments in the materials arguing the case for the Community Land Act, there is nowhere to be found any suggestion that the assumptions underlying the town and country planning system might be unsound. Admittedly, Mr Purdue did not intend an analysis of the philosophy of planning. Nevertheless, he has presented the story of its evolution in Britain, and in telling that story has included excerpts from important reports, decisions and other documents which have contributed to its philosophical constructs. Yet, in none of them is this question raised. One can only conclude that there is, in Britain, a broad popular acceptance of the need not only for planning but specifically for town and country planning, as practiced, which makes that question unnecessary.

What is it that this popular acceptance includes? In various parts of the book Mr Purdue describes some of the more important elements. First, 'planning'. The courts are having difficulty defining the term. After illustrating their difficulty Mr Purdue makes the eminently reasonable suggestion that 'planning considerations' should refer to whatever it is the planners are asked to do. He shows how this definition can change. It was, for instance, expanded as a result of the 1968 and 1971 Acts to include 'social' and 'economic' matters in addition to those of amenity and design. However, this definition is largely determined by departmental regulations describing the elements of the plans to be prepared by local authorities. In practice, these regulations are drawn up by other planners, even though they may be legitimized by passing through the procedural route devised by Parliament.

While there is nothing inherently wrong with this method of definition, it places considerable power in the hands of that sub-group of government administrators comprised of town and country planners. Because, as Mr Purdue points out, the plans provide the 'foundation' for the exercise of both development controls and 'positive planning' activities (such as those to be undertaken by local authorities under the Community Land Act). The powers, which override elements previously considered part of an individual landowner's titular 'bundle of rights' are, of course, described by statute. But the statutory definitions are usually limited to the procedures for their exercise. There is little substantive protection against governmental authority supported by 'planning considerations'. For the most part, the courts will not overturn a decision based on such considerations unless there is a question of legal interpretation involved, or unless the officials acted outside the authority of the law. (Mr Purdue shows that the concept of *ultra vires* can be widely applied to reverse a decision the court considers 'unreasonable', but it

must be a relatively extreme case.)

Finally, the planners who wield these powers may not even be local officials. Although local authorities – and their planners – are expected to take the initiative in drawing up plans, and in enforcing them, their discretion is severely circumscribed by the regulations and circulars that come down from the central ministries. Even the final decisions on exceptions and enforcement may be taken out of their hands by the Minister 'calling in' the case for his own determination.

Popular acceptance of town and country planning in Britain, therefore, includes the recognition that it is necessary, in the public interest, to turn over enormous power (vis a vis other public agencies as well as the private landowner) to a bureaucracy largely separate from the other activities of government, and staffed predominantly by 'planners'. Without such popular acceptance it is unlikely that town and country planning as practiced in Britain can be effective. Little more need be said. There are few developing countries which have the planners needed to run such a bureaucratic machine. There are still fewer countries of the non-socialist world, developed or developing, which would be prepared to give their planners such a measure of real power. To the label 'Made in Britain', should perhaps be added another: 'Not for Export'.

DAVID L. WILLCOX

Maori Land Tenure; Studies of a changing institution, I. H. KAWHARU; *Oxford, Clarendon Press,* 1977; pp 311 and appendices; £13.50 in U.K.

The author of this important book, Hugh Kawharu, has both academic standing as Professor of Anthropology and Maori Studies at Massey University, New Zealand, and the insights born of deep involvement in his people's struggle to retain land both as a basis of valued social tradition and for production in a modern market economy. Underlying the analysis of the complex land law and tenurial practice that has emerged since European settlement is a powerful revelation of the meaning of land rights to Maori people and their resistance to pakeha (white New Zealander) attempts to treat the land, and Maori use of it, solely in economic terms. Under-used Pakeha land is subject to much less pressure.

Chapters 1 and 2 deal mainly with the political, economic, legal and ideological influences on Maori land from contact and colonisation. They develop what I consider the two main negative lessons to be learned from nineteenth-century New Zealand experience; firstly the way in which the colonists' determination to individualise Maori land tenure was prostituted to produce not individual Maori small-holding, but highly negotiable paper titles, easily acquired by the settlers; secondly how clumsy attempts to embody customary principles in the law on succession produced fractionation of title that made effective land use difficult if not impossible. Chapters 3, 4 and 5, carry the discussion into the twentieth century and deal with the various legal and administrative devices (such as land incorporations, conversion of interests, and land settlement schemes

with various forms of agreement among owners) created to bring land in multiple ownership under production by Maori farmers and prevent it being alienated to the pakeha. Indeed this is the only detailed discussion I have seen of the inner dynamics of the various approaches with regard not only to their legal and tenurial aspects, and their economics as farming enterprises, but also the crucial decision-making processes, including relations between owners and users of land, and between them and the state instrumentalities that are so heavily engaged. The interaction of modern and traditional values and processes is well brought out. There is very valuable material in this for policy-makers and administrators in other societies where traditional subsistence-oriented tenure systems are being brought under modern forms of land law to facilitate cash cropping and land transfer. This is particularly true where new attempts are being made, as in Papua New Guinea, to retain a form of group title, with rights for actual users deriving from the primary group. As an adviser to the PNG Government I have read Kawharu's chapters with interest and gratitude.

Chapter 6 recounts the very strong objection taken by the Maori people to legislation of 1967 designed by the governing National Party to overcome problems of multiple ownership and make Maori land more productive. This included compulsory acquisition by the Crown of interests below a certain value, compulsory conversion of some Maori land to the status of freehold land (with greater risk of alienation to pakeha), and modification of the rights of members of land incorporations. The new law, and the spirited Maori response, showed that the issues of the mid-nineteenth century are still very much alive: continued economic and cultural imperialism by the pakeha majority, paternalistic definition by the Government of what is supposed to be the Maori's best intetests, continued reduction of land to economic and commodity status with disregard for its importance to the whole Maori social and cultural complex.

While it is clear that Maoris could not accept the heavy-handed efforts of the 1967 legislation Professor Kawharu's chapter 7 nevertheless does clearly explain the dilemmas which Maori landowners recognise and face, in trying to use land both as the basis of traditional values and as modern farmers; adaptation of title to give *some* Maori viable farms means that other Maori must retain only marginal interests and probably leave the land. The question of increasingly fragmented and fractional interests, tenaciously held largely for cultural reasons by increasing numbers of absentees, remains an issue. To what extent should such interests be compulsorily reduced by modern devices, substituting for traditional mechanisms which caused rights to die unless people actually lived on and used the land?

Useful answers to such questions, acceptable to current Maori opinion, were in fact disclosed by the amendments to the 1967 Act carried under a Labour Government in 1974 and 1975, largely as a result of representations by organisations such as New Zealand Maori Council, the Maori Graduates Association and spokesmen like Professor Kawharu himself. This brings me to a major criticism of Professor Kawharu's book. While there are underlying themes linking all the chapters, the book is in fact a pastiche, inadequately revised, of earlier work. As

Professor Kawharu acknowledges, most of Chapter 1 was presented as a public lecture in 1972, Chapter 2 is abstracted from his Oxford B.Litt. of 1957-8 and Chapters 3 to 5 from a report to F.A.O., subsequently embodied in an Oxford doctoral dissertation. Much of Chapter 6 reproduces a paper written in 1967 and many of the ideas for Chapter 7 appeared in a contribution to a symposium in 1971. This is not a good way to write a book. There is still much overlap and imbalance. The middle chapters still read like thesis material. For the early chapters it is no longer sufficient to use only 'a limited range of published sources long familiar to students of the subject' to develop a particular focus. This is a much favoured and over-used technique of anthropology; it has made the discipline notoriously incestuous. In the last decade New Zealand culture contact historians have produced a whole range of books and theses which would modify a good many of Professor Kawharu's early statements. Moreover it is misleading to leave Chapter 6 as an indictment of the 1967 land legislation without ever mentioning the repealing legislation of 1974 and 1975; after all Professor Kawharu did not write his Preface till December, 1976. The Press as well as the author bear responsibility for not embodying all this very valuable material in a more integrated, up-dated and shortened analysis. I state this strongly not only with regard for the canons of good scholarship and good writing but because as it stands the book is both difficult reading and is too long and expensive. At £13.50 in the UK and $32.00 in New Zealand it will be beyond the acquaintance of all but a few enthusiasts and students required to read it in university courses.

A. D. WARD

The Model Ombudsman: Institutionalizing New Zealand's Democratic Experiment, LARRY B. HILL; *Princeton University Press*, 1976; pp 411; Tables, Appendices, Bibliograohy, Index; £15.60.

In 1962 New Zealand became the first non-Scandinavian country to appoint an Ombudsman entrusted with investigating complaints against bureaucratic decisions and procedures. Directly and indirectly – and hence the title of the book – the New Zealand Ombudsman has been used as a world-wide model for appointments at city, state and national level. Larry Hill offers a detailed analysis of the first twelve years of this 'democratic experiment' in New Zealand. The implications of developments since 1974 – the expansion of the office to include a Chief Ombudsman and two Ombudsmen, a widening of their powers to include some local government matters, and the retirement of Sir Guy Powles who, as Ombudsman from 1962 to 1977, was responsible for putting flesh on to the legislative bones that defined his office – are also discussed briefly.

Hill was blessed with the cooperation of the Ombudsman and generous access to his records. The end result is a book which will be of service to those with an interest in the international comparison of political systems and public administration.

The first section is concerned with background theoretical considerations, and the establishment of the Ombudsman in a New Zealand context. The information provided is useful but tends to be conducted within a framework of institutional

analysis; there is little that will give the outsider any real insights into the nature of New Zealand society. And while Hill's approach to some aspects of his research as 'anthropological' fieldwork is certainly valid and demonstrably useful, little is gained from labouring the point; the pronouncements of Malinowski, so significant in the 1920s, have tended to become commonplace by the 1970s.

In the next section Hill devotes about a hundred pages to a very detailed analysis of the complaints handled by the Ombudsman, the complainants, procedures for handling complaints, and their outcome. Of the complaints made (now in excess of 1,000 per year) the greatest number, not surprisingly in a welfare state, were directed at the Department of Social Welfare (16 per cent) with Education and Inland Revenue (the nation's tax-gatherer) next, but well behind (7 per cent each). Of the total complaints about one-third were declined (usually because they were beyond the Ombudsman's jurisdiction); about one-third were considered not to be justified; and only 11 per cent were found to be justified. The balance were not pursued for a variety of reasons. The figures are a comment on the general competence of the civil service and Hill's finding that many senior bureaucrats considered that the Ombudsman's 'score' would be even lower if the complainants had first sought redress from the department concerned is also worth noting.

While much of this material will be valuable to students of the Ombudsman, the cumulative effect is a barrage of quantitative data which some readers may not survive. A case could be made for banishing the detailed findings to appendices (16 per cent of letters to the Omhudsman were less than 100 words in length) with only generalised conclusions in the text.

The discussion of the impact of the Ombudsman on the governing process is one of the most interesting in the book. Hill lists no less than fifty 'substantive policy impacts'. These concerned matters ranging from the terms and conditions applied to civil servants, teachers, and scholarship holders; procedures for the payment of welfare benefits, the treatment of prison inmates, and discrepancies between legal requirements and government practice.

In the final section, Hill analyses the Ombudsman's reputation with his 'publics' the bureaucrats, the ordinary Members of Parliament, and Cabinet Ministers. These discussions are useful and convincing. There are, however, two 'publics' which, regrettably, have been omitted – the complaining public and the general public. It may be that Hill, under his terms of access, was prevented from approaching complainants – a pity if it was so, but understandable. Some direct injection of complainants views could well have given the book some of the humanity that it lacks. A few more case summaries (there is only one of any length in the book) might also have told more about clients, complaints and procedures than many of Hill's statistics and tables. It is difficult to understand the omission of the general public from the final section. Even the briefest of surveys would have given some indication of the way in which the people of New Zealand regard their parliamentary commissioner.

One is left with the feeling that Dr Hill – a visitor from America – came to know the Ombudsman's office and parts of the bureaucracy very well, but that he got to know New Zealand and New Zealanders by reading files and looking from the windows of the Ombudsman's office.

BARRIE MACDONALD

Aid and Development in Southern Africa, DAVID JONES; *Croom Helm,* 1977; pp 313; £11.95.

In a perceptive, well-presented and easily-readable book David Jones sets out the main features of British aid to the three Southern African countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It is, of course, a fallacy to regard each of these countries as having some form of unity and any objective review of the particular problems of these countries indicates that economies are not really possible through attempting a collective treatment. Notwithstanding their common historical background as former British Protectorates and their economic linkages with South Africa, they are geographically miles apart and, in economic and political terms, the gulf between them is even wider. The length of the book testifies to the complexity of attempting to group together countries which are not only independent but are also fundamentally different.

The operations of the British aid programme in each country reviewed are described with precision and sensitivity and the substantial data contained in this book reflects an impressive amount of research as well as good access to the most reliable statistical information. Similarly the analysis of the development strategies of Swaziland and Botswana offer a comprehensive and systematic examination of the major aspects of these two countries' development efforts. For reasons explained in the section on Lesotho, this did not prove possible in the case of that country but a systematic review of developments there has been achieved notwithstanding the absence of formal national development plans and the difficulties of locating reliable statistical data.

David Jones has presented his conclusions and recommendations before his analysis of the three countries surveyed and, given the detail and length of treatment he has accorded to each country, this is certainly helpful to the reader having regard to the comprehensive background information provided in Part I of his survey. It is to be hoped that this unusual format will not deter the reader from giving careful attention to the three separate country studies which follow. These are each excellent in their own right and the author does deserve full credit for the careful and sympathetic analysis recorded under these headings. The Botswana story is perhaps the most readable since it draws on more reliable data than is typically available in the other two countries and it also sounds an appropriate note of optimism concerning past progress and future policies guiding the economic and social development of that country. He is right, however, to focus as he does on the incomes distribution problem in Botswana which now requires urgent attention, if the officially published voluntary incomes policy is to be applied successfully.

The analysis and conclusions concerning Lesotho provide an illuminating insight into the especially difficult circumstances governing the development of that country. Notwithstanding the relative advantages Lesotho may have in terms of available manpower, Lesotho's employment situation coupled with the chronically limited natural resources provide an almost insurmountable difficulty in attempting to remedy rural improverishment; this certainly inhibits the conception of effective development strategies aimed at escaping from what has to be recognised as a stagnant economy. Swaziland, by contrast, has been remarkably successful in expanding its modern sector, although the apparent neglect of the subsistence sector gives rise to a classic example of one of the worst forms of dual economies. The analysis of the industrial origins of Swaziland's GNP provides clear evidence of the skewed nature of the economy in which a traditional sector (mainly agriculture and forestry) provides some sort of livelihood for approximately half of the Swazi nation, yet only produces 14 per cent of GDP.

The effect of UK aid on the development strategies of all three countries surveyed is well illustrated and it will be difficult to disagree with the author's conclusions. On balance, the three countries have directly benefited from UK aid which, if one sets aside their dependence on cumstoms union revenues from South Africa, undoubtedly had its greatest impact in assisting them to achieve political independence and in the case of Botswana and Swaziland a substantial measure of economic independence. The description of UK aid policies and procedures is accurately presented but the arguments for the use of aid as leaverage to affect the quality and direction of the social policies of recipient countries as advanced by the author, is not without problems for donors and recipients alike, particularly if the proposals put forward in the case against aid set out in Chapter 4 are taken fully into account. On the other hand, there is much that could be said about the quality of the technical co-operation component of the aid programme in view of its importance to all three countries and the measures which might be adopted to improve the selection, motivation and utilisation of the UK personnel employed within this programme and about which DGP appears to remain silent.

This review is not able to do full justice to the comprehensive and informed insights which the author has provided on the B.L.S. countries, and the effects of British aid. His book represents an important contribution to development studies concerned with Southern Africa and should be well received by donors, officials and politicians alike, who are connected or interested in these three countries.

F. J. GLYNN

Land and Labour in Latin America, K. DUNCAN and I. RUTLEDGE (Eds); *Cambridge University Press;* 530 pp; £17.50.

This is a collection of some 18 essays on what is described as 'the development of agrarian capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' in Latin America and the Caribbean. They were produced primarily by historians and geographers for a symposium which was held at Cambridge University in 1972.

Anyone attempting to analyse the diverse experiences of Latin America is taking on a heroic task. In this book the Editors seek to classify the studies into four principal categories. The first group deal with the transformation of the traditional Hacienda into a Capitalist Estate, while the next deals with the use of indigenous labour to develop plantations. The third concentrates on the use of European immigrant labour and the final section concentrates on the transition from slave plantations to capitalist ones.

The difficulty lies in the heteregeneous interests of the authors for while the groupings impose a measure of order to the presentation of the Essays the Essays themselves are disconcertingly independant.

This indeed may be a strength for the virtue of meticulous foreign scholarship in a continent rent by social schisms is considerable. One cannot but feel, however, that the Essays however well researched are mostly too dated to enable people to understand the problems of landlords and peasants which the Cambridge Symposium reviewed. Many of the Essays relate to the experiences of the Continent in the nineteenth century and almost all end well before the Second World War.

Michael Toussigs' Essay on the evaluation of rural labour in the Cauca Valley of Colombia from 1700 to 1970 is a brave and largely successful attempt to bring history to our doorstep. While there are fascinating accounts of individual estates in Colombia, of dispossession of labour in Northern Argentina and of the transformation of Haciendas in Chile, the Studies give one the impression of comfortable self-interested scholarship which characterises so many of our Faculties. Nevertheless they do provide a foundation for others to build upon and they do open a number of windows on murky backgrounds.

To be fair any attempt to generalise about Latin America, a Continent far more diverse than Europe is not a fruitful exercise. However, micro studies which enable a better understanding of economic history in Latin America is desirable and this book makes a useful contribution to this end. At £17.50, however, it is likely to rest on the shelves of Institutions rather than those of students.

G. A. BRIDGER

Book Notes

Political Power: USA/USSR, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI and SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON; Index, pp 461; £2.25.

Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI; Index, pp 334; £1.60.

Both of these books are new paperbacks published by *Penguin Books.*

'Political Power' is sub-titled 'Similarities and contrasts: convergence or evolution' and the special interest of this well-argued work of political science lies in the subtitle. In effect, the authors say that the thinking behind the chief protagonists of detente is one the lines that despite their obvious divergencies the USA and the USSR will enter a phase of 'mutual discovery', that 'convergence' will come and with it the withering of communism in the 'age of high mass-consumption', that post-Stalinist liberalisation will bring Russia nearer to the American concept of Freedom, that both countries are in many ways becoming more alike. This is a popular view, with which the authors are unable to agree, pointing out that each country has operated a successful political system, but that to converge would require a momentous change of historical course which in terms of practical politics must be ruled as highly improbable. Of course evolution is taking place in both countries but it is over-simplifying the changes involved to suggest that they are pointing to a single socio-economic mould.

In his earlier book Dr Brzezinski provides what he properly describes as a 'think piece', still with some of John Kennedy's optimism when he saw himself as the President for whom 'the whole world was, in a sense, domestic politics'. Since then the burnt fingers and the damaged conscience of Vietnam intervention have caused the USA to recoil from intervention in any shape and helped ensure a Carter victory at the polls. Dr Brzezinski is now of course Special Assistant to the President for national security affairs – a post for which he would appear to be particularly well qualified. He is a realistic liberal and has no illusions about Russia's objectives – hence no doubt the hostility shown towards him by the USSR and Cuba when they attribute President Carter's attitude on Angola to Dr Brzezinski's interpretation of events.

Business Arithmetic for Co-operatives and Other Small Businesses, TREVOR BOTTOMLEY; *Intermediate Technology Publications, London;* pp 87.

There are many Primary Societies in Anglo-phone Third-World countries where, particularly in isolated rural areas, the clerks responsible for keeping the books and/or the Committee Members of the Co-operative concerned either have no one to ask or are perhaps reluctant to show their ignorance by asking what is the right way of working out a simple arithmetical sum which they realise they ought really to know already. Likewise, in the informal sector, the small entrepreneur's ignorance of arithmetic can rapidly bring disaster to his business.

This small clearly written basic arithmetic should help to resolve many such problems and The Intermediate Technology Development Group is to be commended for making it available.

As B.A. Youngjohns points out in the Preface, 'co-operatives can succeed or fail according to the quality of their book-keeping and accounts' and here from a very elementary level upwards, Trevor Bottomley points the way towards essential proper book-keeping.

The International Co-operative Movement, W. P. WATKINS; *Co-operative Union, Manchester;* pp 116.

The author is a former Director of the International Co-operative Alliance and in this brief volume he provides the historical background to the growth of the Co-operative Movement, sets out the institutional framework within which the movement has developed and, finally looking into the future, envisages a genuinely 'world' movement emerging from the present international co-operative structures, and helping to meet the need

to improve the management of the world's economy for the benefit of mankind.

Zambia: Impact of Industrial Strategy on Regional Imbalance and Social Inequality, Research Report No. 44, M. R. BHAGAVAN; pp 76.

The State of Guinea-Bissau, Research Report No. 45; PETER AABY; pp 33.

Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden.

No 45 is a lightweight little pamphlet. Peter Aaby takes the opportunity to expound his views on African Socialism, but it is doubtful whether his preconceived ideas are particularly relevant to the state of Guinea-Bissau, about which he is supposed to be writing.

No. 44 is more substantial and provides some very interesting statistics on the industrial sector of Zambia, on the classification of goods and manufactures, etc., all helpfully annotated. The reader should not be put off by a disingenuous first chapter that would have been best excluded. Nonetheless the text tends to be naive and the author does not seem to appreciate that raising wages in the Northern agricultural areas to the level of the copperbelt resulted in a population decline because the agricultural North could not afford mining town wages.

The author is right to point out that Zambia's economic and social position is not unique, but wrong to suggest that a one-ore/UDI-affected situation was not unique and ergo an exacerbation of difficult circumstances, right to draw attention to the continuing Zambian gap between rich and poor, wrong to attribute the inevitable difference between piously expressed good intentions and developmental reality to a deliberate policy aimed at maintaining the privileges of the few.

The Abu-Ghazaleh English/Arabic Dictionary of Accountancy, TALAL ABU-GHAZALEH; *Macillan, London,* 1978; pp 210; £8.50.

This new and excellently printed dictionary is a credit to author and publisher alike. With increasing commercial contacts between Britain and the Arab World, the production of an up-to-date practical manual such as this should prove of considerable value both to English-speaking and Arab-speaking partners in a business venture. An additional asset is the guidance given to the practitioner.

The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act, 1977 and Code of Guidance, MARTIN PARTINGTON; *Sweet and Maxwell;* £1.50.

This useful small guide provides the text of Britain's important Housing Legislation of 1977.

The annotations provide the background to the new law, the definitions now applicable, not only to those concerned with Housing in the United Kingdom, but to many in the Third World who have to deal with their very many homeless, this book should prove of very real value.

Local Authority Accounting in Ireland, T. P. GOLDEN; *Institute of Public Administration, Dublin;* Appendices and index; pp 276; £5.00.

T. P. Golden maintains the high standard of work which one has come to expect in publications from the IPA in Dublin. He is indeed to be congratulated on the skill with which in less than 300 pages he has been able to set out fully and clearly the principle and practice of Ireland's system of local government accounting.

The material of this volume should prove of practical value not only to practitioners but to students and those interested in the management of local government business, in the developing world as well as western democracies. Here is a system which works well, carefully examined and providing guidelines that others could usefully follow.

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